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INSCRIBING JUDICIAL PREFERENCES INTO OUR
FUNDAMENTAL LAW: ON THE EUROPEAN PRINCIPLE OF
MARGINS OF APPRECIATION AS CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE U.S.
Larry Catd Backer'
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of
the courts. A constitution is in fact - and must be regarded by the
judges as - a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascer-
tain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceed-
ing from the legislative body.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent constitutional jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court appears to lend considerable support to advocates of the compara-
tive law theories of legal convergence.2 Among the more interesting clues
to this convergence is the way in which some judges would have the
Professor of Law and Executive Director, Tulsa Comparative & International Law
Center, University of Tulsa. An earlier version of this article was presented in a panel discus-
sion: Queering/Querying the Law, at the Conference, The Letter of the Law: Law, Literature
and Culture, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California, March 1, 1997.
Special thanks to Marty Belsky, Melissa Koehn, and Steven Hargrove for their help and
comments on earlier versions of this article. I would like to especially single out my research
assistant, Charles Keckler, for his very able assistance on this article.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. The theories of convergence all posit, from somewhat different bases and with differ-
ent consequences, that world legal systems are becoming more alike. For a discussion of
convergence theories, see, e.g., PETER DE CRUZ, COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD
475-97 (1999) (describing four philosophical bases of convergence - the return of the jus
commune, legal evolution, natural law, and Marxist theory - and three strategies of conver-
gence - active programs for unification, transplantation, and natural convergence). For an
interesting comment touching on convergence and difference in constitutional interpretation,
see Mary Ann Glendon, Commentary, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 95 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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American Supreme Court restructure itself to more closely resemble, in
outlook and method, the constitutional courts of civil code countries. In-
deed, the last decade of the twentieth century has seen the American Su-
preme Court begin to develop the tools of a civil law court. Among the
most important of these has been the evolution of general principles of
law analogous, in some ways, to general principles of law in civil law
systems.3 Like their European counterparts, these general principles of
law serve four purposes in constitutional interpretation - to guide to in-
terpretation of primary law, to guide to the exercise of power under the
primary law, to provide criteria for determining the legality of acts, and to
fill in gaps in primary or secondary law to prevent injustice.4
These general principles of law have begun to be applied in matters
of American constitutional interpretation. Among them is the general
constitutional principle of fairness.5 This essay considers another, more
problematic general principle of law, the general principle of "margin of
appreciation."6 The margin of appreciation is essentially a rule of defer-
ence.7 The principle results in a rule of statutory construction which per-
3. To some extent, the common law has always recognized general principles in vastly
diluted form - as canons of construction. For a succinct discussion of canons of constructions
and presumptions in statutory interpretation, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 25-29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). But
general principles of law in the civil law context serve much more important purposes. Gen-
eral rules or principles work like doctrine "though they can be vindicated like any particular
rule, they serve a dual purpose: as pointers to interpretation by the courts and as indication of
policy to legislators." D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES 179 (5 th ed., 1991)
4. NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 121 (1996).
5. See Larry Catd Backer, Fairness as a General Principle of American Constitutional
Law: Applying Extra-Constitutional Principles to Constitutional Cases in Hendricks and
M.L.B., 33 TULSA L.J. 135 (1997).
6. For discussion of the margin of appreciation in context, see, e.g., HOWARD C.
YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTmINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996); Laurence R. Heifer, Finding a Consensus on Equal-
ity: The Homosexual Age of Consent and the European Convention on Human Rights 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1044, 1052-59 (1990). "Although the margin of appreciation has now be-
come a mechanism frequently employed by the Convention institutions, its origin lies in a
very narrow context." Angela Thompson, International Protection of Women's Rights: An
Analysis of Open Door Counseling Ltd. and Dublin Well Women Centre v. Ireland, 12 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 371, 379 (1994) (the principle was developed to provide deference to state action
in time of national emergency involving I.R.A. terrorists and fighting in Greece). The margin
of appreciation began to be applied in a wider variety of cases starting with Handyside v.
United Kingdom., I Eur. H.R. Rep. 737 (1976) (censorship).
7. The phrase itself "is borrowed from French administrative law, in which it is used to
describe the extent to which a court will make allowance for the exercise of discretion by a
person fulfilling an administrative responsibility." J.A. Andrews, The European Jurispru-
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mits states a certain discretion "to decide whether a given course of ac-
tion is compatible with" Constitutional requirements8 unless such discre-
tion departs from a generally accepted consensus of the community.9 The
margin of appreciation principle is a European innovation. It has been
basic to the interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights of the
European Convention of Human Rights.'" It has also been used by the
European Court of Justice in interpreting the obligations of Member
States within the European Communities." The principle is applied by
analogy by Canadian courts. 2 Some have also suggested application of
the principle in other contexts, for instance in the context of regulation of
international trade.'3 Considering the development of an American consti-
tutional principle of deference provides valuable context and perspective
into the broad jurisprudential project of the Supreme Court liberated from
the peculiarly provincial form in which discussion of the judicial role in
constitutional interpretation is usually conducted.' 4
The basis of this remaking of the Court has been the increasing dis-
comfort, at least among some of the Justices, that Constitutional jurispru-
dence and the common-law may be mutually exclusive, or at least that the
broad methods of the common law must be diffidently applied to the in-
dence of Human Rights, 43 MD. L. REv. 463,496 (1984).
8. DONNA GOMIEN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER 215 (1996).
9. On the doctrine of consensus, see Eyal Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consen-
sus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 843, 849-53 (1999). See also
discussion infra Part III.
10 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter Human Rights Convention] (entered into force Sep-
tember 3, 1953).
11. For example, the European Court of Justice has permitted Member States a wide lati-
tude in regulation which might otherwise impermissibly interfere with the free movement of
goods where the uncertainties of scientific assessment prevents the creation of a consensus
on the appropriate level of regulation within the European Community. See, e.g., Case
174/82, Criminal Proceedings Against Sandoz BV, 1983 E.C.R. 2445 (prohibition of impor-
tation into one Member State from another of food containing addition of vitamins A and D);
Case 94/83, Criminal Proceedings Against Albert Heijn BV, 1984 E.C.R. 3263 (regulation of
vinchlozoline residue on fruit resulting in prohibition of importation into one member state
of apples produced in another).
12. See Paul Michell, Domestic Rights and International Responsibilities: Extradition
Under the Canadian Charter, 23 YALE J. IN'L L. 141, 170-73 (1998) (arguing for the trans-
position of the margin of appreciation principle to international extradition).
13. See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS
Agreement: The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357
(1998).
14. For a defense of the comparative method in rights discourse, see MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
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terpretation of the fundamental law of the land.' 5 Justice Scalia has been
the most candid and enthusiastic advocate of the shift in the Court away
from a common-law to a more civil law oriented approach to statutory
and constitutional interpretation.16 But the advocates of the civil law ap-
proach to American constitutional interpretation are nothing if not incon-
sistent. Leading the pack in this respect, perhaps, is Justice Scalia. While
our civilian-friendly judges would like to purge constitutional interpreta-
tion of its common law elements, they tend to avoid a fuller embrace of
the approach of civilian courts in constitutional construction. I argue here
that what appears to judges like Justice Scalia to be a variant of the com-
mon law sin, in matters of constitutional interpretation, of permitting un-
elected judges to decide what the law is'7 may instead evidence the de-
velopment of an American variant of the civil law general principle of
margins of appreciation. 8 Ironically, the end result may not be different
15. "Common-law courts performed two functions: One was to apply the law to the facts.
All adjudicators - French judges, arbitrators, even baseball umpires and football referees -
do that. But the second function, and the more important one, was to make the law." SCALIA,
supra note 3, at 6. This represents a change from the stance of judicial conservatives of a
prior era. See, e.g., Norman Dorson, John Marshall Harlan, in THE WARREN COURT: A
RETROSPECTIVE 236 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996) ("Harlan saw himself primarily as a judge
deciding cases rather than as an ideological dispenser of general doctrine, as Rehnquist
sometimes appears to be." Id. at 248).
16. See SCALIA, supra note 3. In advocating what he calls textualism and original under-
standing as the proper basis for judicial interpretation of statutes and the constitution, Justice
Scalia argues that the methods and philosophy of the common law are dangerous. He sug-
gests "that once we have taken this realistic view of what common law courts do, the uncom-
fortable relationship of common-law lawmaking to democracy (if not to the technical doc-
trine of the separation of powers) becomes apparent." Id. at 10. As a result, interpretation of
statutes and constitution cannot be treated "as simply an inconvenient modern add-on to the
judiciary's] primary role of common-law lawmaker. Indeed, attacking the enterprise with
the Mr. Fix-it mentality of the common-law judge is a sure recipe for incompetence and
usurpation." Id. at 14.
17. Scalia states:
[t]he ascendant school of constitutional interpretation affirms the exis-
tence of what is called the Living Constitution, a body of law that (unlike
normal statutes) grows and changes from age to age, in order to meet the
needs of a changing society. And it is the judges who determine those
needs and 'find' that changing law.
Id. at 38.
18. 1 offer a small caveat here. I do not intend to write here about statutory or constitu-
tional interpretation as such. The controversy over the appropriate approach to statutory
interpretation has been a matter of a lively debate. The scope of that debate is hinted in Jus-
tice Scalia's work. For a good basic discussion of the issues, with good references to impor-
tant studies in the field, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY




results in particular cases, but a more principled basis for reaching these
results. "9
Part II begins with a consideration of the pragmatic American ap-
proach to the problem of politics in constitutional construction. In the
U.S. the discussion about judges, courts and constitutional interpretation
revolves around the pragmatic concern with intervention in the political
sphere. To focus the discussion, I examine this problem through Justice
Scalia's critique in Romer.2" Self-described traditionalist judges like Jus-
tice Scalia decry judicial interventionism in constitutional interpretation.
The interpretive project is flawed to the extent that the techniques of the
common-law are applied to a quintessentially political document like the
federal Constitution, and therefore solely subject to change through the
political process. Yet traditionalists, like their counterparts, the 'liberal
elite,' are equally eager to exercise 'will' and not 'judgment' in their rush
to capture the hermeneutical machinery of the judiciary.2' Indeed, it has
been common since the founding of the Republic for courts intervene in
19. This result should not be all that surprising. Perhaps the reason was best expressed
somewhat cynically by Eric Heinze when he noted that "[w]hen the judge can draw upon six
ancillary doctrines, with no clear rules dictating those doctrines' meanings, scope or hierar-
chy inter se, it matters not a whit what the judges' rationale is for reaching a decision, as one
or another of these ancillary doctrines will justify any outcome." Eric Heinze, Principles for
a Meta-Discourse of Liberal Rights: The Example of the European Convention on Human
Rights, 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 319, 329 (1999). Compare the common-law classic
critique of canons of construction, see Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appel-
late Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 401 (1950) (arguing that canons exist to support both sides or any argument over
interpretation).
20. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (amendment to state constitution effected
through a statewide voter referendum which precluded all legislative, executive or judicial
action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the status of persons
based on their "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relation-
ships" violated the Equal Protection Clause of the federal Constitution). I do not attempt a
detailed legal analysis of the case here. I focus here on the rhetorical value of the case, that
is, the literary value of Romer. For a discussion of the construction of the law of Romer as
black letter, see, e.g., Larry Catd Backer, Reading Entrails: Romer, VMI and the Art of Di-
vining Equal Protection, 32 TULSA L. J. 361 (1997); Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built
in a Day: The Subtle Transformation in Judicial Argument Over Gay Rights, 1996 Wis. L.
REV. 893; Tobias Barrington Wolff, Note, Principled Silence, 106 YALE L. REV. 247 (1996);
Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 257 (1996);
Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REv. 203
(1996); ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND THE
AMERICAN DECLINE (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward Leaving Things Undecided, The
Supreme Court 1995 Tenn, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996).
21. See Bernard Schwartz, "Brennan v. Rehnquist" - Mirror Images in Constitutional
Constructions, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 213 (1994).
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this way without the slightest concern for a long time.22 Every judgment
is political, at least in the sense that it constitutes a pronouncement of
what socio-culture mores are; not what it will be or might be or can be.
Que serd is a function for juries and the legislature in England, and for
republican government in the United States. 23
Part I recasts the American debate. Assuming that what appears to
be a judicial debate about the propriety of the imposition of 'political'
judicial solutions to particular problems is instead, a struggle over the
application of a general principle of deference, a margin of appreciation,
to state action, the article considers the development of the doctrine of
margin of appreciation in Europe. The general principle of margin of ap-
preciation has been well developed by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) which oversees the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.24 That approach also
has been used effectively in the European Union.25 The ECHR's sexual
22. For an early example, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (court
has the power to review state and federal legislation for conformity to constitutional limita-
tions). For a later example, see Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857).
23. For a discussion of lawmaking in the context of proscriptive norm making, see Larry
Catd Backer, Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production: Interpretive Conversations
Between Courts and Culture, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 291. The solution for traditionalist
critics of intervention is originalism, substituting a political predilection of the enacting
legislature for that of the interpreting judge. Originalism and intervention are the code words
used by traditionalists to define the opposite poles of their interpretive universe.
24. Human Rights Convention, supra note 10. The enforcement proceedings can be com-
plex. Complaints are first reviewed by the European Commission of Human Rights. Com-
plaints not resolved by that body are usually (but not always) referred to the European Court
of Human Rights. Sometimes complaints may be referred to the Committee of Ministers
(although decisions of this body may also be appealed to the European Court of Human
Rights). Decisions of these bodies are usually (but not always) given specific effect. See
Helfer,supra note 6, at 1047-53. By March, 1994, all but one of the signatories of the Human
Rights Convention had signed Protocol No. 11 pursuant to which the present system of en-
forcement will be replaced by a single permanent court modeled on the European Court of
Justice. See Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ludwig, Principal Characteristics of the
new ECHR Control Mechanism as Established by Protocol No. 11, 15 HuM. RIGHTS L. REv.
81(1994)
25. See Case 13/96, P. v. S. & Cornwall County Council, 2 C.M.L.R. 247 (1996) (termina-
tion of transsexual violated European Union's sex discrimination directive). For a discussion
of this case within the context of the contradictions of the European Union's "constitutional"
imperatives, see, Larry Catd Backer, Harmonization, Subsidiarity and Cultural Difference:
An Essay on the Dynamics of Opposition Within Federative and International Legal Systems,
4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 185 (1997). The European Court of Justice is currently consid-
ering whether sexual orientation discrimination in employment is sex discrimination prohib-
ited by the organic law of the European Union. See Case 249/96, Grant v. South-West
Trains, Ltd., 1 C.M.L.R. 993 (1998).
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rights decisions, and in particular cases such as Dudgeon26 and Norris,27
provide a useful illustration of that approach.
Recasting the American debate in terms of the general principle of
deference represented by the margin of appreciation has great utility in
the U.S. constitutional context. 28 I conclude in Part IV with an examina-
tion of two decisions, Bowers and Romer, in the tradition of the European
civil law based courts. On that basis it is clear that Bowers is a decision in
trouble (and much criticized precisely because Court refused to impose
the now well established legal consensus on the limitations of the use of
the criminal law to regulate the sexual activities of sexual minorities in
the United States). On the other hand, the Romer court applied an estab-
lished political consensus to prohibit Colorado's attempt to deviate from
that consensus, rendering a decision far less problematic for the judicial
culture. The Court shied away from any pronouncement on questions still
very much open to cultural discussion,29 limiting its pronouncements to
26. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981) (N. Ireland buggery and
gross indecency laws applied to adult private consensual activities violated Art. 8(s) of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222). The court found that the governments reasons for justifying the
legislation to be insufficient in that
the moral attitudes towards male homosexuality in Northern Ireland and
the concern that any relaxation in the law would tend to erode existing
moral standards cannot, without more, warrant interfering with the appli-
cants private life to such an extent. 'Decriminalization' does not imply
approval and a fear that some sectors of the population might draw mis-
guided conclusions in this respect from reform of the legislation does not
afford a good ground for maintaining it in force with all its unjustifiable
features.
Id. % 61.
27. Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186 (1988) (Irish buggery and gross indecency
laws applied to adult private consensual activities violated Art. 8(s) of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.
222). In determining that the Irish government had breached Article 8 of the Convention, the
court extensively cites Dudgeon and concluded, as did the Dudgeon court, that "it cannot be
maintained that there is a 'pressing social need' to make such acts criminal offenses." Id.
46.
28. Others have attempted to employ the reasoning of the European approach to American
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Markus Dirk Dubber, Note, Homosexual Privacy Rights Before the
United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights: A Comparison of
Methodologies, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 189 (1990) (differences in historical methodology can
explain difference in approaches to privacy jurisprudence between the U.S. and Europe);
James D. Wilets, Using International Law to Vindicate the Civil Rights of Gays and Lesbians
in United States Courts, 27 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REV. 33 (1995); Nadine Strossen, Recent
U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Proc-
ess Analysis and Proposed Synthesis 41 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (1990).
29. Thus the wisdom of the majority's silence on Bowers, much criticized by Justice
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explanations of basic rules for determining the ways our political society
may determine the nature of participation in our Republic.
II. THE PROBLEM IN JURISPRUDENTIAL CONTEXT
Justice Scalia accuses the majority in Romer v. Evans0 of crafting a
political decision - of acting like a legislature. Justice Scalia bemoans the
state of events in which "[t]he Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit
of spite."'3' For him, as for some traditional liberals,32 where culture is at
the root of a case, the courts ought to stay their hand. Such kampfen are
"left to be resolved by normal democratic means, including the democ-
ratic adoption of provisions in state constitutions. 33 Justice Scalia here
applies the arguments of twentieth century pragmatists, 4 but with a twist.
The twist combines the realist assumption that all judging is the imposi-
tion of personal predilection with the idea that common-law judicial
lawmaking is especially inappropriate when a court must interpret law
made by a democratically constituted legislative body, to produce a prin-
ciple of judicial interpretation based on the application of the understand-
ing of the meaning of a legislative provision at the time of its making.3
Only in this way, it is argued, can the court's avoid the personal and resist
the temptation to revise the constitution through the law making art of
common law judicial hermeneutics.
Justice Scalia has made this argument frequently, though usually
only when he thinks he is on the losing side of the argument.36 Justice
Scalia in dissent. For a different perspective on the majority's silence respecting Bowers, see,
e.g., Jacobs, supra note 20.
30. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
31. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
32. For a discussion of liberal incrementalism and minimalism, see, e.g., Sunstein, supra
note 20.
33. Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. For a comparison of legal realist and traditionalist views of statutory interpretation, see
Kent Greenawalt, Variations on Some Themes of a "Disporting Gazelle" and His Friend:
Statutory Interpretation as Seen by Jerome Frank and Felix Frankfurter, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 176 (2000) (comparing the approaches of Frankfurter and Frank). Justice Scalia accepts
the core learning of the legal realists but for the purpose of rejecting their project of judging
as essentially anti-democratic. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 3 ("It is only in this century,
with the rise of legal realism, that we came to acknowledge the judges in fact 'make' the
common law, and that each state has its own." Id. at 10).
35. See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 37-39.
36. Thus, for example, in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), a dissenting
Justice Scalia scolded his colleagues for their constitutionalization of proscriptions of previ-
ously lawful single-sex state supported educational institutions. "The people may decide to
change the one tradition, like the other, through democratic processes; but the assertion that
either tradition has been unconstitutional through the centuries is not law, but politics-
[Vol. 7:327
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Scalia is at least half right. Courts craft political decisions. Yet, Justice
Scalia's jurisprudential project is no less political, or intrusive, than those
of the decisions he so loudly decries. Every exercise of constitutional in-
terpretation, including the determination that the Constitution does not
forbid an exercise of state or federal governmental discretion, is a politi-
cal pronouncement. Each shapes the way our society must gauge its ad-
herence to the basic law of the land. Each such pronouncement is authori-
tative law in the United States, every bit as effective as legislative acts.37
The battle over the propriety of courts serving as the ultimate interpreter
of constitutional authority was determined within decades of the estab-
lishment of the Republic,38 though only by judicial pronouncement
backed ultimately by a successfully fought war that ended in 1865.
Like legislative pronouncements, judicial hermeneutics are not a
permanent scar on the face of the eternal federal Constitution - not even
when the mutilation is accomplished by as skillful an artist as Justice
Scalia.39 The emerging European Courts, charged with the interpretation
of the fundamental law of that conglomeration, have increasingly demon-
strated both the ease and necessity of judicial political hermeneutics. °
For Justice Scalia, Romer was a quintessential, and aberrational po-
litical case. It was not about law but about political power. The politics
here, of course, was one of choice - that is a choice between two
constitutional traditions. Justice Scalia is unhappy with the choice the
majority made and calls it mere politics from which the court should flee.
Perversely, he himself would not have hesitated to make a choice in that
smuggled-into-law." Id. at 569. See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (religious
invocations at school ceremonies prohibited under First Amendment; Justice Scalia in dissent
scolded the majority for a decision based on their "changeable philosophical predilections."
Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). On occasion, though, Justice Scalia is able to weave his
own "changeable philosophical predilection" into the fabric of the constitutional jurispru-
dence of the court itself. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (use
of peyote in ceremonial of native religious practice).
37. On the creation of a basic law of judicial construction through the imposition of gen-
eral principles of constitutional law, see Backer, supra note 5.
38. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
39. Alexander Hamilton reminded us that
it is not to be inferred from this principle [the power of the people to alter
or amend the Constitution] that the representatives of the people, when-
ever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of the majority of their
constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution,
would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions; or
that the courts would be under a greater obligation to connive at infrac-
tions in this shape than when they had to proceeded wholly from the ca-
bals of the representative body.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469-70 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
40. See infra Part Ill.
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case. He makes that quite clear. That choice, however, he would no doubt
have labeled jurisprudence. Yet, politics it remains. I examine the charge
of politics hurled by Justice Scalia at the Romer majority, and use that
argument from politics to interrogate the necessarily political nature of
judicial decision making and the consequences of those politics.
Colorado's Constitution was amended by will of a majority of voters
to provide that:
"[n]either the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or de-
partments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipali-
ties or school districts, shall enact, adopt, or enforce any statute, regu-
lation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or oth-
erwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have
or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or
claim of discrimination. '41
In Romer v. Evans, six justices of the Supreme Court, speaking through
Justice Kennedy declared the quoted provision invalid as a violation gen-
erally of our cultural "commitment to the law's neutrality where the
rights of persons are at stake,"42 and specifically of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Federal Constitution. Amendment 2 impermissibly created
a solitary class of people for the purpose of withdrawing from them spe-
cific legal protections against discrimination as well as forbidding the
reinstatement of those legal protections. 3
Humbug! vents Justice Scalia in dissent.44
"There is a problem, however, which arises when criminal sanction of
homosexuality is eliminated but moral and social disapprobation of
homosexuality is meant to be retained .... The problem (a problem,
that is, for those who wish to retain social disapprobation of homo-
sexuality) is that, . . . those who engage in homosexual conduct...
[seek to use their political power] to achiev[e] not merely a grudging
social toleration, but full social acceptance, of homosexuality.
'45
41. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (quoting Colo.Const., Art. II, § 30b).
42. Id. at 623.
43. I leave discussion of the majority opinion for later. See infra note 84. See also articles
cited supra note 2.
44. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The focus, of course, was on what Justice Scalia
characterized as the fruits of a political battle, that is, legislation benefiting one group at the
expense of its political enemies and done within the basic process guaranteed under our re-
publican form of government. In this case, the spoil of the democratic process was the elimi-
nation of a political rival from the field through the enactment of an amendment. Amend-
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Justice Scalia, along with the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, are
understandably frustrated with the ramifications which the "liberal" deci-
sion to "decriminalize" homosexual conduct, taken a generation ago, has
produced.46 Like Chicken Little,47 Justice Scalia inveighs against an inter-
ference by the Supreme Court in the political processes of Colorado. As
Justice Scalia well knows, law is politics, and politics is a game in which
the Courts ought not to interfere (except to preserve the status quo).48 In-
deed, the game becomes dangerous for our political system as the Court
indulges its taste for a politics of change camouflaged with the high
sounding language of constitutional theoretics. And besides, since when
was it in appropriate to dislike 'homosexuals' even as a matter of law?!
In a sense, though, Justice Scalia is right. There is a "homosexual
agenda" to which the good Justice apparently subscribes.49 This "agenda"
ment 2, after all, had been adopted by popular referendum. The Colorado Supreme Court
struck down the amendment. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, 513 U.S. 1146
(1995), and affirmed under the name Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). For a critical
discussion of the use of initiatives as a means of expressing the popular will, see, e.g., Wil-
liam R. Adams, Pre-Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Challenges: Issues of Electoral Fair-
ness, Majoritarian Tyranny and Direct Democracy, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 583 (1994).
46. On the ramifications of the liberal approach to decriminalization of "homosexual"
conduct and the limitations of that approach, see Larry Catd Backer, Exposing the Perver-
sions of Toleration: the Decriminalization of Private Sexual Conduct, the Model Penal Code,
and the Oxymoron of Liberal Toleration, 45 FLA. L. REv. 755 (1993).
47. I refer, of course, to that barnyard animal who, having been hit on the head with a
falling acorn, roused the community of his farm animal friends to action with the declaration
that the sky was falling. As it turns out, the sky did not fall, but barnyard discipline was
maintained, group norms affirmed, and the vigilance of the barnyard against any evidence of
'falling sky' increased.
48. I have elsewhere explored the way in which law, in the form of state constitutional
interpretation, is used to build judgment into standardized characterizations of litigants, and
use those constructed characterizations to resist constitutional reinterpretation. See Larry
Catd Backer, Constructing a 'Homosexual' for Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative,
Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States and British Courts, 71 TuL. L. REV. 529
(1996).
49. On the "homosexual agenda," see, e.g., Terry S. Kogan, Legislative Violence Against
Lesbians and Gay Men, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 209 (examining the ways legislatures, in this
case the Utah legislature, can act to mythologize homosexuals as a class deserving violent
treatment). This agenda appears to be a favorite of so-called traditionalist legislators as Pro-
fessor Kogan shows.
Their social agendas, speaking of homosexuals, is clear. Destigmatize, le-
gitimize and gain privilege. They say they seek equality, but the very na-
ture of their existence only lends itself to contention as they move their
way into the value system of middle America. They ask for something
they can only achieve through despotism; forcing Americans to accept
homosexual sodomy as they do their own heterosexuality. What begins as
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seeks to "move the center of public discourse along a continuum from the
rhetoric of disapprobation, to rhetoric of tolerance, and finally to affirma-
tion."5° While the relevance of this 'agenda' to the issue strictly before
the court was questionable at best, Justice Scalia brings the issue to the
forefront of the discussion in the opinions. Justice Scalia would subvert
law through politics - where identifiable groups might benefit from a
particular outcome, any decision by a court is political; and political deci-
sions are nonjusticiable. It would follow that any objection to laws ad-
versely affecting groups which have been traditionally the object of the
disapproval of other groups invariably raises all issues affecting these
denigrated groups to the level of politics, and therefore beyond the reach
of the courts.5
The implications of this argument are even more appealing when ap-
plied to contain the habits and practices of groups at the margins of
dominant society. Perversely, perhaps, I assert that it is even more ap-
pealing when applied to dominant group agendas. Inverted, Justice
Scalia's arguments have great force. In the guise of tradition, the con-
cerns and benefits accorded dominant groups have always masqueraded
as law, even constitutional law.52 For there is also a "traditionalist
a call for equality will naturally lead to a call for privilege.
Id. at 223 n.83.
50. Andrew M. Jacobs, The Rhetorical Construction of Rights: The Case of the Gay
Rights Movement, 1969-1991, 72 NEB. L. REV. 723, 724 (1993). See, e.g., SHANE PHELAN,
GETTING SPECIFIC: POSTMODERN LESBIAN POLITICS 57-75 (1994); RUTHANN ROBSON,
LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW (1992); Patricia A. Cain, Litigating
for Gay and Lesbian Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993).
51. Power, tradition, and the force to control both, thus, belong to those who can control
the machinery of government. Jurisprudential niceties apply only at the margin, as the locus
of protection for the exercise of legislative discrction within the black letter of the fundamen-
tal law. But tradition and traditional practice must necessarily remain supra-constitutional.
The relationship of accommodation to power to control of the legislative function was clearly
enunciated in Employment Division:
But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is per-
mitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally
required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be dis-
cerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to
the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable conse-
quence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which
each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
52. One of the better articulations of the notion that tradition is its own pedigree, is found
in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). There Justice Scalia succinctly ex-
pressed his overarching hermeneutical premise: "The short of the matter is that jurisdiction
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agenda" which Justice Scalia deliberately and consciously serves quite
well. This agenda serves traditional culture as it is popularly understood
by the 'common man.' These understandings are embodied in the "plebe-
ian attitudes that apparently still prevail in the United States Congress."53
But traditionalism is a neurotic overlord.
What seems to tell in favor of traditionalism, then, is the fact that it is
simple to apply. When making political decisions in accordance with
the traditional method we simply rely on our own habits and preju-
dices and on the habits and prejudices of people concerned by the de-
cisions. However ..... [t]raditionalism... seems not to operate unless
there is a unanimous opinion among people concerned about what are
and are not relevant similarities. There is a traditional way of dealing
with this problem, too, however. It is to narrow down the scope of
those whom we consult before making a decision. In the limiting case
the people who govern do not consult anyone at all besides them-
selves.
54
based on physical presence alone constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing
traditions of our legal system that define the due process standard of 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."' Id. at 619. The danger, of course, is one that Justice Scalia
ignores as he furthers his project of "inscribing one after another of [his] preferences... into
our basic law." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Scalia's formalism, like that of his ideological enemies, is equally able to stymie our
"free[dom] to change." Id. As Justice Brennan noted, somewhat ironically in dissent in
Burnham, "[a]lthough I agree that history is an important factor in establishing whether a
jurisdictional rule satisfies due process requirements, I cannot agree that it is the only factor
such that all traditional rules of jurisdiction are ipso facto, forever constitutional." Burnham
v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 629 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
54. TORBJORN TANNSJO, CONSERVATISM FOR OUR TIME 49 (1990). Critical Race theorists
have long argued this point, but from the perspective of those who always fall outside the
ambit of the group whose unanimous opinion constitutes "tradition." Thus, for instance,
Richard Delgado has argued that traditional American notions of merit have no relevance to
groups excluded from the process of creating the "meritocratic tradition." See Richard Del-
gado, Affirmative Action as a Majoritarian Device: Or, Do You Really Want to be a Role
Model? 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991). Like Justice Scalia's traditionalism, then, critical
race theory understands that whiteness can be viewed as the place from which definition
begins. Its legal ramifications have been explored as part of the project of critical race theory.
Cf. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993). It's regulatory
potential as between subordinated groups has also been explored. See Lisa Ikemoto, Traces
of the Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean American Conflict: How
We Constructed "Los Angeles, " 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1993) (using an analysis of the
"white over colored supremacy" to understand the 1992 Los Angeles riots). The problem of
definition was succinctly observed by Audre Lorde: "[flor Black Women as well as Black
men, it is axiomatic that if we do not define ourselves for ourselves, we will be defined by
others for their use and to our detriment." AUDRE LORDE, Scratching the Surface: Some
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And yet this is precisely what Justice Scalia tells us embodies the nefari-
ousness of the interpretive follies of the non-elected (liberal) judicial elite
sitting on the court!
One can see, then, that the courts serve the traditionalist agenda as
well as it serves any other. Indeed, in the law constraining sexual minori-
ties, the courts appear to better serve narrowly interpreted traditionalism
than it serves any other interest. In this endeavor, the courts have served
miserably as agents of the liberal elite in its efforts to impose its will on
the unsuspecting and restive masses of the ignorant, including the igno-
ramuses in Congress. The courts do serve tradition, but a tradition which
is the synthesized product of that small group of judge-priests who have
anointed themselves as the only true speakers of tradition. That group
necessarily includes Justice Scalia and the courts when it suits him; it
apparently does not include any judicial adherents to other "systems of
authority and allegiance.""5 The courts are meant to serve as guardians of
the understandings of this homo americanus against an elite with cultur-
ally totalitarian habits. Courts err when they impose on "all Americans
the resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members of this
institution are selected, pronouncing that 'animosity' toward homosexual-
ity . .. is evil. 56 And yet in this role of preserver of the tastes of the
mythical 'common (straight) man' the courts have cultivated a distorting
sexual totalitarianism far more perversive than anything attempted by the
Romer majority.57
Thus, Justice Scalia moans overmuch about decisions like Romer as
inhibiting the ability of homo americanus "to prevent the piecemeal dete-
Notes on Barriers to Women and Loving, in SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 45
(1984).
55. TANNSJO, supra note 54. Tannsjo gives as an example "Polish society, where a con-
servative Catholic Church was facing a conservative Communist Party. However, in situa-
tions like these, it is to be expected that a modus vivendi will be obtained, if for no other
reason, simply because both of these conservative bodies will fear a radical workers' move-
ment." Id.
56. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Indeed, the courts have used the narrative of sodomy, the aggregate of the stories of
the sodomy litigants appearing before them, to construct a normative 'homosexual' type
which can be used to construct a status quo of disgust largely resistant to jurisprudence.
These images confirm the value of popular folklore about the essence of
the "average" sexual non-conformist. As products of this (constructed)
narrative, sexual non-conformists - objects of revulsion - are not worth
judicial effort; so fundamentally disgusting, they provide the courts with a
powerful source of resistance to the decriminalization of (homo)sexual
conduct. Courts are certainly empathizing, but the result is the erection of
narrative walls of antipathy towards sexual non-conformists.
Backer, supra note 48, at 536.
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rioration of the sexual morality favored by a majority of [in this case]
Coloradans."58 Quite the opposite is true. As Justice Scalia himself ob-
serves, the "society that eliminates criminal punishment for homosexual
acts does not necessarily abandon the view that homosexuality is morally
wrong and socially harmful."59 In this sense there is a core of truth in Jus-
tice Scalia's observation: there is a problem when conduct is decriminal-
ized but retains a strong social and moral taint. Decriminalization within
the context of social and moral condemnation has created a means for
regularizing the status of sexual minorities. 60 It provides a judicially tol-
erated basis "by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional
sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to re-
vise those mores through use of the laws."'6' But decriminalization has not
disturbed cultural norms except perhaps at the margin. Indeed, decrimi-
nalization was meant to preserve, the vast power of society to impose
substantial costs of those who belong to these sexual minorities. Here,
politics is sanctioned by the imprimatur of a majority.6"
Of course, that is the problem, for Justice Scalia chides the majority
in Romer for doing precisely this. But, then, of course, he is unhappy with
the result in Romer and not with the form of action undertaken by the
courts generally. Justice Scalia is then forced to play politics himself.
Taking the role of Caesar to the Romer majority's Pompey, Justice Scalia
exclaims: "[w]hen the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be
with the knights rather than with the villeins - and more specifically the
58. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
60. The notion applies to other minorities as well. As Justice Scalia noted in another con-
text,
[v]alues that are protected against government interference through en-
shrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the politi-
cal process. Just as a society that believes in the negative protection ac-
corded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that af-
firmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society
that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be
expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
61. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). While outside the scope of
this essay, it is interesting to note the hints of the techniques of plain, traditional, and old-
fashioned Jew-baiting implicit in Justice Scalia's dissent. See, e.g., id. at 645. "[T]hey pos-
sess political power much greater than their numbers" and they enjoy "enormous influence in
American media and politics." Id. at 652. For a discussion of the relationship between the
techniques of classical Jew-baiting and those of gay-baiting, see DIDI HERMAN, NORMALCY
ON THE DEFENSIVE: THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT'S ANTI-GAY AGENDA (Chicago 1996).
62. While outside the scope of this paper, consider the jarring antimonies between Justice
Scalia's political majoritarianism and James Madison's anti-factionalism. For the latter, see
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
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Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which
the Court's Members are drawn. '63 Justice Scalia is particularly troubled
by the manner in which judicial participation in the culture wars distort
the level playing field of politics.64
Thus, the "game-stopping" arbitrariness of Supreme Court constitu-
tionalism undermines "that fortress which is our Constitution," by resting
on the quicksand of "the changeable philosophical predilections of the
Justices of this Court;" constitutionalism "must have deep foundations in
the historic practices of our people." As such, for Justice Scalia, the core
fatality of constitutional hermeneutics is the result when the Court takes
sides - pronouncements always tend to terminate the argument. That,
after all, is his sense of the nature of Constitutional adjudication.
The virtue of the democratic system with a First Amendment is that it
readily enables the people, over time, to be persuaded that what they
took for granted is not so, and to change their laws accordingly. That
system is destroyed if the smug assurances of each age are removed
from the democratic process and written into the Constitution. So to
counterbalance the Court's criticism of our ancestors, let me say a
word in their praise: they left us free to change. The same cannot be
said of this most illiberal Court, which has embarked on a course of
inscribing one after another of the current preferences of society (and
in some cases only the counter-majoritarian preferences of the soci-
65
ety's law-trained elite) into our basic law.
63. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Thus, in Lee v. Wiesman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), the Court was chided in terms similar
to that used in Romer:
[iun holding that the Establishment Clause prohibits invocations and bene-
dictions at public-school graduation ceremonies, the Court - with nary a
mention that it is doing so - lays waste a tradition that is as old as public-
school graduation ceremonies themselves, and that is a component of an
even more longstanding American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God
at public celebrations generally. As its instrument of destruction, the bull-
dozer of its social engineering, the Court invents a boundless, and bound-
lessly manipulable, test of psychological coercion, which promises to do
for the Establishment Clause what the Durham rule did for the insanity
defense. See Durham v. United States, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d
862 (1954). Today's opinion shows more forcefully than volumes of ar-
gumentation why our Nation's protection, that fortress which is our Con-
stitution, cannot possibly rest upon the changeable philosophical predilec-
tions of the Justices of this Court, but must have deep foundations in the
historic practices of our people.
Id. at 631-32 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This parallels
similar views expressed in an earlier establishment clause case, where Justice Scalia, in dis-
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But Justice Scalia is playing cute. Indeed, there is much of the anti-
federalist in Justice Scalia's arguments.66
But such an argument ignores the vast hermeneutical possibilities
within constitutional adjudication. It obliterates the knowledge that
Lochner67 and West Coast Hotels68 flow from the same words. It ignores
the reality that Plessy69 and Brown0 were products of the same Constitu-
tional parent. It misunderstands the false traditionalism of Reynolds.7 It
misunderstands the political, jurisprudential, and interpretive facility of
the judiciary. What could be more fundamentally political than the shift
from Swift72 to Erie?73 Consider the normative shifts which produced In-
sent rebuked the court for its constitutional hermeneutics, the direction of which was not to
his taste. For him, such interpretiveness "continues, and takes to new extremes, a recent
tendency in the opinions of this Court to turn the Establishment Clause into a repealer of our
Nation's tradition of religious toleration." Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School
District v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 752 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Certainly, the mistrust of the judiciary is as old as the founding of the Republic. Con-
sider the similarity of Justice Scalia's reservations with arguments made more than two hun-
dred years earlier, arguments on the losing side of the ratification debate.
They [the courts] will give the sense of every article of the Constitution
that may come from time to time before them. And in their decisions they
will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules, but will de-
termine, according to what appears to them, the reason and spirit of the
Constitution.
Anonymous, On the Power of the Judiciary, in 3 THE ANNALS OF AMERICA (1968) (article
first appearing under the pseudonym "Brutus" in the New York Journal and Weekly Regis-
ter, January 31, 1788). For a discussion of the Anti-Federalist position on the judiciary, see,
e.g., JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 1781-
1788 125-26 (1961).
67. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
68. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (repudiating Lochner's con-
struction of Constitutional restraints on state legislation in the course of affirming a
Washington State wage law).
69. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
70. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (the last formal repudiation of
Plessy in the context of public education).
71. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) (upholding polygamy conviction of a
Mormon).
72. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) (federal courts were free to apply general
law principles in diversity cases and courts were to follow the general law rather than state
law in diversity cases where state law deviated form the general law). There was a time when
judges believed that the law was a unitary substance, knowable but for the imperfection of
the judges seeking it out. Case law represented a striving for this perfect and necessarily
unitary conception of law.
73. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts must follow state
substantive law in diversity actions). "Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson
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ternational Shoe7 4 from the underlying world view encapsulated in Pen-
noyer.75
The hermeneutics of law is a function of the Courts - and it is a pe-
culiarly political function. It is far too late in the day to carry on about our
common law judges as interpreters of a dynamic text. That has been a
function of judges in the Jewish and Christian traditions from the begin-
ning of the dominance of that tradition.76 And it certainly suits a tradi-
tionalist like Justice Scalia to "inscib[e] one after another of [his] current
preferences [based solely on his singular interpretation of acceptable tra-
ditional normsl... of society... into our basic law.
77
And so, it should be clear to us that Courts engage in the basic exer-
cise of interpretation of our core political document all the time. All such
interpretations are necessarily political. Most are not problematical be-
cause of the existence of a substantially singular view on the subject of
the interpretation. In the usual course, it follows that in this endeavor the
Court acts as the willing handmaid of the dominant ideology as expressed
in the popular culture and to the detriment of sexual minorities seeking
had revealed its defects, political and social." Id. at 74.
74. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (adopting minimum con-
tacts analysis for determining the constitutional limits of personal jurisdiction over 'absent'
defendants).
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal ser-
vice of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not pre-
sent within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 316. Justice Scalia is fond of emphasizing the last part of the quoted passage. Far more
interesting is the first part of the sentence. "Traditional notions" tend to shift as society shifts,
and the role of the Court as interpreter of the 'basic law' is to change along with it. The obli-
gation to interpret, and adjust, is itself traditional in our Republic.
75. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 714 (1877) (in accordance with general principles
of international law; personal jurisdiction may be exercised only on persons or things within
the territory of the forum).
76. As I have elsewhere explained, there is a Biblically derived normative core to Anglo-
American notions of judging.
The Biblical resonance is inescapable: "And when the Lord raised them
up judges, then the Lord was with the judge, and delivered them out of the
hand of their enemies all the days of the judge: for it repented the Lord
because of their groanings by reason of them that oppressed them and
vexed them."
Backer, supra note 48, at 543 (quoting Judges 2:19).
77. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a
trenchant analysis of the radicalism of the new so-called judicial conservatives, see Schwartz,
supra note 21.
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"to use the legal system for reinforcement of their moral sentiments [to
which they are entitled] as are the rest of society."78 The great ally of the
sexual majority continues to be an aggressive court system.
The enforcement of a legalized code of moral and social disapproba-
tion has traditionally provided the sexual majority with the means to im-
pose their will on sexual minorities through law.79 There is a consensus in
this country that sexual moral standards can be enforced, and thus, gov-
ernment ought to be given a wide margin of discretion in the construction
and enforcement of these conduct codes. Justice Scalia fears this margin
of appreciation has been lost in the law crafted by Romer.80 But what Jus-
tice Scalia understands and (from his perspective, quite correctly) forgets
is that the majority of Supreme Courts,8' including the federal Supreme
Court much of the time,82 continually involve themselves in what Justice
Scalia characterizes as the political process by declaring that states retain
a wide latitude to declare that animus toward homosexuality is good, and
on that basis to act. The courts have acceded to the pronouncement that
sexual deviance is evil, and will continue to do so. Courts have used that
pronouncement, that disapprobation, in acts not of "judicial judgment, but
of political will."83
78. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 646 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
79. Justice Scalia correctly expresses the common view:
[i]f it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual con-
duct criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact
other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct.... And a fortiori it is
constitutionally permissible for a State to adopt a provision not even dis-
favoring homosexual conduct, but merely prohibiting all levels of state
government from bestowing special protection upon homosexual conduct.
Id. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80. This point is nicely articulated by Andrew Jacobs:
gay fights advocates and gay litigants attempted to litigate around Bowers
by arguing that the due process holding of Bowers was unrelated to
whether the Equal Protection Clause sheltered gays as a class. Gay rights
advocates lost this argument, as antigay litigants persuaded courts of the
wisdom of Justice Scalia's a fortiori argument [517 U.S. at 641]. Now,
however, those precedents switch teams, and become gay law: if it is con-
stitutionally impermissible under the rational basis standard for a state to
adopt a civil law which does not even greatly directly burden homosexual
conduct, because moral disapprobation of gays is a form of bigotry
against the powerless, then a fortiori, criminal laws targeting gays for
greater social disadvantage should also be impermissible.
Jacobs, supra note 20, at 962-63.
81. For a discussion of the jurisprudence of disapprobation inherent in the sodomy law
rulings of state supreme courts over the last thirty years, see Backer, supra note 48.
82. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
83. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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What follows is not what Justice Scalia fears - the ability of this mi-
nority to undermine the sexual moral order of the majority through law.
Instead, the Romer majority reasserted the American consensus that pre-
serving the sexual moral order may not be furthered by endangering the
foundations of the majority political order. Indeed, the Romer majority
did not suggest that social animus toward homosexuality was bad - it
merely indicated that mere social animus is an insufficient basis on which
to restrict the ability of people (with shared characteristics or shared po-
litical goals) to resort to the legislative process for self-interested political
ends. 84
mII. A COURT OF DEFERENCE AND ENFORCED CONSENSUS
Politics is thus not the dirty word Justice Scalia have it be when at-
tached to the work of the American courts. Consciousness of the political
function of courts induce no national trauma nor induce a rush to consti-
tutional therapy for our judiciary. We expect our judges to be impartial in
a particular case. 85 We find little cause for concern about the politics of
84. That is not to say that this, in itself, was not an important jurisprudential insight. In-
deed, the Romer majority clearly could be read to indicate a willingness to reconceive the
concept of "rational basis." See Backer, supra note 20. Perhaps taking a hint from several
appellate court cases in the "military" cases, the Romer majority appeared to follow a more
rigorous approach to what constitutes a rational basis for legislation, at least legislation af-
fecting the ability of people to participate in the political process. In this sense, Part III of the
majority opinion breaks substantial new ground. What had once been a mindless test of
(ir)rationality suddenly has acquired teeth. Thus, the majority suggests that in order to deter-
mine constitutional rationality there must exist not only some link between the classification
and the object to be obtained, but that objective must now be independent of that classifica-
tion and serve legitimate legislative ends. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. Well, so far nothing spe-
cial. But the majority then goes on to suggest that an illegitimate legislative end is "[animos-
ity] toward the class [of persons] affect[ed]." Id. This is new in its baldly stated form, and
important. The creation of specific categories of illegitimacy provide the court with a means
to discredit the rationales offered by the state in support of the Amendment. This is striking.
At least in cases in which economic regulation is not at issue, it appears that the majority has
sanctioned a more searching analysis of regulatory rationales "if the law seems unwise or
works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale seems tenuous." Id. The
freedom the majority apparently gives the courts to discredit regulatory rationales where
broad statutes have a substantial adverse affect on (targeted) groups provide litigants with an
opportunity to challenge policy in the courts in a way which was not credibly possible be-
fore.
85. But see Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Color of Truth: Race and the Assessment of Credibil-
ity, 1 MICH. J. RACE & L. 261 (1996). Our concern seems to be far more with financial or
family involvement. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1996); Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisi-
tion Corp., 486 U.S. 847 (1988) (appearance of impropriety where judge was a trustee of a
party with an interest in the litigation then before him).
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judicial decisions when, for example, an African-American female judge
must pass judgment on disputes between an African-American female
and a white male; we expect our judges to do their duty. 86 Yet we are
troubled when Courts interpret our fundamental law in ways which have
readily apparent normative or political consequences. In these cases, for
both 'progressives' and 'traditionalists,' all hope of impartiality, of the
avoidance of the imposition of judicial personal preference, disappears. 7
The question of politics is unproblematic when interpretations of
core cultural norms are relatively similar. "Politics" becomes an issue
when large interpretive differences exist in our understanding of those
norms. As such, Courts find it 'easiest' to speak for the political when its
function is purely interpretive. It finds its voice far less authoritative
when it plunges into battles over the identification and implementation of
'definitive' cultural norms. It finds its authority weakened still more
when it speaks to end debate by a definitive pronouncement during the
course of such a debate. A certain 'margin of appreciation,' 88 a political
space, must be maintained for society to know its own mind. Courts serve
as a place where that socio-political space is maintained. Courts also
serve as a place where the boundaries of this margin may be contested.
Such contestation is the essence of modem understanding of the value of
courts in the constitutional or big picture, sphere. 89 However, courts can-
not be the place where such battles are settled. During the course of the
86. The question of judgment motivated or compelled by religious belief is a more subtle,
and increasingly problematical question. For a provocative view of the relationship between
religion and governing, see John H. Garvey, The Pope's Submarine, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
849 (1993) ("But the dilemma for the observant Catholic ... is real. The solution is not, as
Justice Brennan once suggested, to set aside his religious beliefs. It is to recuse himself, if
that is possible, or resign if it is not." Id. at 875.).
87. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 261-65 (1990) (traditionalist argument); GIRARDEAU SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE
COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORrTES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1995) ("pro-
gressive" perspective).
88. For a discussion of the 'margin of appreciation' as a term of art in the law of the Euro-
pean Union, see infra at notes 97-102. For a general discussion of the concept of margin of
appreciation, see, e.g., Pieter van Dijk, The Treatment of Homosexuals Under the European
Convention on Human Rights, in HOMOSEXUALITY: A EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ISSUE:
ESSAYS ON LESBIAN AND GAY RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND POLICY 179 (Kees Waaldijk &
Andrew Clapham eds., 1993).
89. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROwrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977) (case stud-
ies of judicial intervention effecting fundamental change in policing, juvenile law, education
and the nature of suffrage); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS
BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 35 (1991) (on the limitations of the courts' power over so-
cial change); LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL CHANGE
(David A. Schultz ed., 1998) (passim., critical analysis of the power of the courts to effect
social and political change).
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battle, courts may police 'fairness' 90 but their voice is considerably
smaller when they presume to speak for a political unit which has not yet
made up its mind.
The real political power of courts as gatekeepers on cultural change
through a power of deference and enforced consensus is illustrated in the
writing of the European Court of Human Rights. It is a jurisprudence
which the European Court of Justice, the judicial organ of the European
Union, has subscribed. This has become especially apparent as the Euro-
pean Court of Justice continues an increasingly important project of craft-
ing general principles of law applicable to the European Community legal
order.91
90. In this sense, process oriented jurisprudential writers may be right. See, e.g., Jurgen
Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 771, 776 (1996). A number of thought-
ful analyses of Habermas' proceduralism can be found in Habermas on Law and Democ-
racy: Critical Exchanges, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 767 (1996). Important, also, in this regard, is
the process oriented jurisprudence, increasingly discredited among those with definitive
political agendas to further (whether liberal, conservative or 'other'), is Herbert Wechler's
classic interrogation of Brown v. Board of Education. See Herbert Wechler, Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 32-35 (1959). For criticisms of that
process centered approach on the basis of various (and opposing) political perspectives, see,
e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960) (politics necessary as the expression of lived historical experience and popular culture
expressed as shared social meanings); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (1988) (process is itself a political choice, and perhaps not a happy
one). For a critique of the sort of false hope encouraged by hortatory norm-changing deci-
sions, in the context of the U.S. race cases, see Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, in
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE 21-34 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) (arguing
that the Supreme Court retards rather than enhances the ability of subordinated groups to
advance their rights based agendas).
91. The issues of the origin, use and limitations of the concept, "general principles of
Community law" remain controversial in Europe. I do not discuss those questions here. For a
general discussion of the genesis of principles of Community law, see, e.g., EMILIOu, supra
note 4, at 115-33 (1996); JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 71-79 (1993); Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust:
Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of
Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the European Communities, 61
WASH. L. REv. 1103 (1986). Emiliou suggests four applications of general principles in
constitutional interpretation: (i) to guide to interpretation of primary law, (ii) to guide to the
exercise of power under the primary law, (iii) to provide criteria for determining the legality
of acts, and (iv) to fill in gaps in primary or secondary law to prevent injustice. EMILlOu,
supra note 4, at 121.
For an example of the enunciation of general principles of law withing the European
Community legal order, see, e.g., Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v.
Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125 ("In fact, respect
for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the
Court of Justice. The protection of such rights, whilst inspired by the constitutional traditions
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Political or ethical principles sometimes enter into the legal system
disguised as supra-systemic principles allegedly referred to or implied by
valid norms of the system or by formal interpretive consequences of
these. If such principles are incorporated into the legal system, e.g.,
through court decision, they might be considered as reasons guiding fur-
ther decisions, for principles are regarded as general norms having an
explanatory and justificatory force in relation to particular decisions or to
particular rules for decisions.92
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the su-
preme judicial tribunal established under the Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Human Rights Con-
vention),93 is based on the perceived utility of regularizing the status quo
within the normative framework of the Human Rights Convention. That
framework protects, among other things, the right to respect for private
and family life (Art. 8), and the freedom to enjoy protected rights without
discrimination (Art. 14). The Human Rights Convention, however, per-
mits a state to limit protected rights under a number of circumstances.
Art. 8 rights may be limited in the interest of public safety, public order,
national security, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of
the rights of others, but only if such limitations are "prescribed by law"
and "necessary in a democratic society."94 The European Court of Human
Rights had previously stated that: "the requirements of morals varies
common to the Member States, must be ensured within the framework of the structure and
objectives of the Community." Id. 4). Leo Flynn has recently noted the political nature of
the interpretive enterprise of the European Court of Justice in connection with the develop-
ment of the 'constitutional' principle of equal treatment.
Certain writers have supported such moves [to ignore when necessary the
intent of the original legislators] to ensure full protection of minorities'
rights, noting that a major ethical challenge for the Community's judica-
ture is the 'realization that vindicating human rights may strain the per-
ception of the Court's legitimacy in judicial, political and social circles',
all the while recognising that this task only properly arises when the per-
sonnel of the Court are "exercising the discretion the law allows them."
Leo Flynn, Case C-13/94, P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, 30 April 1996, Judgement
of the Full Court, [1996] ECR 1-2143, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 367 (1997) (citing, in part,
J.J. Weiler & Lockhart, "Taking Rights Seriously" Seriously: The European Court and Its
Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 51-94, 579-627, 627 (1995)).
92. See BENGOETXEA, supra note 91, at 75 (citing D.N. MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING
AND LEGAL THEORY 260 (1978)).
93. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 10.
94. Human Rights Convention, supra note 10, art. 8. Art. 14, by contrast, supplements the
substantive rights accorded by the Human Rights Convention and has no independent exis-
tence. See, e.g., N. v. Sweden, App. No. 10410/83, 40 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 203,
206 (1985).
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form time to time and from place to place, especially in our era."95 As a
consequence, "State authorities are in principle in a better position than
the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of those
requirements."96 Under this interpretive regime, the Human Rights Court
imposes a particular interpretation of the signatory states' obligations
under the Human Rights Convention only when a clear consensus
emerges in the constitutional orders of the signatory states.97
The doctrine of deference has been criticized on a variety of grounds.
Some commentators have noted that the essence of the principle results in
an inevitably arbitrary application of the principle.9 Others have asserted
that the principle is incompatible with the concept of the supremacy of
95. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur.H.R. Rep. 737, 48 (1976).
96. Id. This passage was recalled in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149,
52(1981).
97. Dr. Heinze explains:
[a] compression of the margin of appreciation and its ancillary doctrines
to one sentence would result in something resembling the following: [t]he
State enjoys a margin of appreciation to place a restriction on the exercise
of an individual right, but subject to European supervision, in light of that
restriction's necessity, and of the legitimacy of its aim, and of the propor-
tionality of the restriction to that aim, with regard to the practice of other
Convention States.
Heinze, supra note 19, at 330. For a discussion of the mechanics of determining consensus
under the principle, see, e.g., Laurence R. Heifer, Consensus, Coherence and the European
Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 133 (1993). Hilary Charlesworth has
noted that
[a] review of the approximately two hundred cases of the European Court
permits the following generalizations. A wide margin of appreciation of
judicial restraint is applied in the following contexts: (1) the law deals
with economic policies; (2) the law is in transition; (3) the aim of the law
is to protect public morals; (4) the subject matter of the law is the design
of electoral systems; or (5) great diversity of approach currently exists
among the contracting parties. On the other hand, a narrow margin of ap-
preciation of judicial activism is applied where (1) the individual right is
particularly important... ; (2) the infringement of the right is great or the
essence of the right is affected; (3) the aim of the law is the protection of
the authority of the judiciary; or (4) a great uniformity of approach exists
among the contracting parties.
Hilary Charlesworth et al., Resolving Conflicting Human Rights Standards in International
Law, 85 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PRoc. 336, 339 (1991).
98. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 6, at 398; Heinze, supra note 19, at 329 (1999) ("The
margin of appreciation doctrine amounts to nothing more than its application in any particu-
lar case."); Natalie Klashtorny, Ireland's Abortion Law: An Abuse of International Law, 10
TEMP. INT'L & COMI'. L.J. 419, 441-42 (1996) (decrying the selective and arbitrary manipu-
lation of the margin of appreciation to deny states the right to criminalize homosexual activ-
ity but not to deny states the right to prohibit abortion).
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international human rights norms.
Margin of appreciation, with its principled recognition of moral rela-
tivism, is at odds with the concept of the universality of human rights.
If applied liberally, this doctrine can undermine seriously the promise
of international enforcement of human rights that overcomes national
policies .... Inconsistent applications in seemingly similar cases due
to different margins allowed by the court might raise concerns about
judicial double standards. 99
Even in the original area of its application, the principle of deference has
been criticized as inappropriate.100
Though these arguments raise legitimate points, a strong case can be
made that on balance the arguments do not ultimately persuade that the
doctrine should be abandoned. First, the arguments point perhaps to bad
judging in particular cases rather than bad principles incapable of being
used to reach a just or legitimate or authoritative result. Bad or illegiti-
mate judging, like bad or illegitimate legislating, can always transcend
the ability of any set of rules to contain it.' Moreover it is not clear that
the principle of margin of appreciation thwarts the universalizing project
of human rights.'0 2 The better defense of the principle, however, is cen-
tered on legitimacy, critical to the work of any court.
99. Benvenisti, supra note 9 (citing Fionnula Ni Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity:
Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 101, 114, 119 (1995)
(suggesting that democratic states are given a wider margin of deference than those suffering
a democratic deficit)).
100. See, e.g., Oren Gross, "Once More Unto the Breach": The Systematic Failure of Ap-
plying the European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J.
INT'L L 437 (1998) (a critical analysis of the normalcy-rule emergency exception basis of
derogation because, in part, states of emergency has become the norm in many places).
101. This perhaps is a central lesson that Fionnuala Ni Aolain draws in her study of the rise
of divergence within the theoretically universalist jurisprudence of human rights. "[W]hile
we seek to standardize the wording of Human Rights Instruments as a means of universaliz-
ing rights, we fail to pay sufficient attention to the role of the interpreters of those standards
and the structures that enforce them." Fionnula Ni Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity: Dif-
ferences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 101, 141-42 (1995).
102. See, e.g., Johan D. van der Vyver, Universality and Relativity of Human Rights:
American Relativism, 4 BuFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 43 (1998) (the doctrine "does not support a
relativist position; it cannot be relied upon to negate particular rights, or even to afford an
interpolated meaning to the general concept of human rights or to any of its particular mani-
festations .... [it] simply affords a limited discretion ... as to how the limitation of Conven-
tion provisions .. can best be imposed under the prevailing circumstances .... " Id. at 50).
But see Helfer, supra note 13, at 357 n.217) ("What is most striking about the margin of
appreciation is that it expressly contemplates that international treaty obligations originating
from a unitary text may be interpreted in different ways in different states." Id. at 357.).
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Seeking to ground its decisions, especially the more controversial
ones, in the actual practice of the Member States helped [the Human
Rights Court] establish its political legitimacy over time and helps it
maintain legitimacy in the midst of expanding the scope of the Con-
vention=s coverage. By apparently displacing the source of the devel-
oping norms from the judges on the Court to the other states of the
European region, the comparative exercise protects the Court from
charges of overreaching judicial activism. It thus helps maintain the
viability of the system, making it less likely that either the Convention
organs will act contrary to the will of a large number of the constituent
states, or that a divergent state will abandon the system out of protest
over the Court's intrusion into national political morality.'
0 3
Moreover, especially in the difficult area of contextualizing the
words of provisions granting fundamental rights and delimiting the fun-
damental relationship between the State and its citizens, the margin of
appreciation represents the type of principle of judicial restraint which
seeks to strike a reasonable balance between the interpretive role of the
judge and the need to preserve the democratic principle which vests legis-
lative power in the elected representatives of the people.' ° These are no-
tions at the core of Justice Scalia's interpretive project,'05 though there are
implications." 6
On the basis of this principle of self restraint, of legitimacy through
deference and of enforced consensus, the Human Rights Court recently
established a European-wide right to private consensual sexual activity
103. Paolo G. Carozza, Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human
Rights: Some Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 73
NOTREDAME L. REV. 1217, 1227 (1998).
104. For an argument along these lines, see Paul Mahoney, Judicial Activism and Judicial
Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 11
HuM. RTs. L.J. 57 (1990). For an attempt to apply the principles to the 1997 Russian Free-
dom of Conscience and Religious Associations Law, limiting protections for religions to
those sects which could be registered with the state, see Joseph Brossaart, Legitimate Regula-
tion of Religion? European Court of Human Rights Religious Freedom Doctrine and the
Russian Federation Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations", 22
B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 297, 317-20 (1999).
105. See SCALIA, supra note 3, at 9-14 (arguing that common-law lawmaking is essentially
anti-democratic and more so when the techniques of the common law are applied to the in-
terpretation of statutes). "I do question whether the attitude of the common-law judge ... is
appropriate for most of the work that I do, and much of the work that state judges do. We
live in an age of legislation, and most new law is statuary law." Id. at 14.
106. See id. at 37-47 (arguing that looking to modern practice fosters a cult of the judge and
cannot be based on any standards other than judicial personal predilection).
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between males. 0 7 A consideration of two of the early principal cases in
which this right was delineated 8 demonstrates the power of politics as
the vehicle for determining law, and the utility of explaining the law in
terms of the concurrence of jurisprudence and politics. These cases are
the expressions of judicial hermeneutics of core political documents in
which the decisions are rendered with full consciousness of the politics of
the task of judging within the confines of a document. "Legal norms can
never be drafted in such a way as to guarantee that they will always be
capable of a literal application to all fact situations which may arise; as
such a degree of uncertainty in inherent in legislation and a need for in-
terpretation cannot be eliminated."' 09 How much truer this is in connec-
tion with the hermeneutics of our fundamental law; this law, our founding
parents were quite clear in reminding us, were written to be deliberately
general." 0
The political nature of "private life" decisions, as in other areas of
social flux, was incorporated in the Court's jurisprudence through the
doctrine of the 'margin of appreciation.' The doctrine essentially permits
courts to arbitrate between competing normative claims in multi-state
organizations, from federations to regional treaty associations. For some,
it is part of the revolution in the balance of power between coordinate
branches of government, and between local and general governments.
"The problem, for constitutional lawyers, is to find acceptable criteria by
which to define the new balance of power. This leads, for want of better,
107. See Human Rights Convention, supra note 10. Understand that the right of a person
"to respect for his private and family life," art. 8(1), is limited by state interests in the protec-
tion of morals. Id. art. 8(2). Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 737 (1976)
(states are permitted a wide degree of discretion in legislating to protect the morality of its
citizens). The rights of sexual non-conformists are private rights; they are rights which end at
the point that the window shades are open, or the public is permitted to become conscious of
the act. See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981); see generally,
Heifer, supra note 6, at 1054-62. On the internationalization of human rights, see M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Pro-
cedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. CoMp.
& INT'L L. 235 (1993); Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International
Law, 82 COLtJM. L. REV. 1110 (1982).
108. See Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186 (Ser. A No. 142)(1988) (Irish buggery
and gross indecency laws applied to adult private consensual activities violated Art. 8(s) of
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, November
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981)
(same considering the law of N. Ireland).
109. "Indeed, the process of engaging in a literal application of a legal provision to a
straightforward case itself requires interpretation; in this sense even 'easy cases' presume an
understanding of the purpose of the legislation." Flynn, supra note 91, at 373 n.12 (citing
Toni, 2 LEGAL PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 227 (1978)).
110. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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to the use of imprecise phraseology (such as 'the margin of appreciation'
enjoyed by the Member States or the institutions). . ,,I" This rebalanc-
ing results from the need to mediate between competing norms both ver-
tically (among coordinate units of government) and horizontally (between
local and general governments).' 12
Within the context of the Human Rights Treaty, the doctrine of the
margin of appreciation is simple enough. A state may interfere with a
right protected under the Treaty if it can demonstrate the necessity of that
interference. That demonstration usually requires proof of the existence
of a 'pressing social need.' But "it is for the national authorities to make
the initial assessment of the pressing social need in each case; accord-
ingly a margin of appreciation is left to them" subject to review by the
Court." '3 It must also demonstrate that the restriction is proportionate to
the legitimate aim pursued."4
As I have elsewhere argued in connection with the expansion, by the
European Human Rights Court, of the rights of transsexuals against sex
discrimination:" 5
111. David A.O. Edward, What Kind of Law does Europe Need? The Role of Law, Lawyers
and Judges in Contemporary European Integration, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 13 (t998-99).
112. For Judge Edward, this need for mediation has resulted in what is for him an advance
of "fuzzy logic" in law.
International norms, Community norms, national norms and sometimes
(with the trend towards devolved government) regional norms compete
for precedence, without always having a clearly defined hierarchy be-
tween them.... Someone must then determine what are to be the criteria
for identifying the applicable norm and for applying it to the case at hand.
In the absence of legislative texts defining which norm is to be applied,
that task falls to the judge.
Edward, supra note 111, at 12.
113. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 1 52 (1981); see also Handyside
v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 48 (1978).
114. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 49 (1978).
115. See Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 (1991); Rees v. United King-
dom, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1987). In Cossey, a person, born male, who underwent gender
reassignment surgery and lived as a woman challenged the denial, by the United Kingdom,
of her request to obtain a birth certificate indicating she was female, and the legal restriction
on her ability to marry a man. The European Court of Human Rights, held, over vigorous
dissents, that there had been no violation of either Articles 8 or 12. In Rees, a person, born
female, who underwent medical treatment and lived as a man challenged the denial, by the
United Kingdom, of his request to obtain a birth certificate indicating he was male. The
European Court of Human Rights, held, over vigorous dissents, that there had been no viola-
tion of either Articles 8 or 12.
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[w]here there exists "little common ground between the Contracting
States," national entities enjoy "a wide margin of appreciation." Thus,
"[a]lthough some contracting States would now regard as valid a mar-
riage between a person in Miss Cossey's situation and a man, the de-
velopments which have occurred to date cannot be said to evidence
any general abandonment of the traditional concepts of marriage."
[However], the very lack of consensus which gives the margin of ap-
preciation its widest [ambit also serves as the political vehicle for
changes in] the Human Rights Court's [ability to interpret the Human
Rights Convention to foreclose the use of the margin of appreciation,
especially where the Court] becomes "conscious of the seriousness of
the problems facing transsexuals and the distress they suffer. Since the
Convention always has to be interpreted and applied in the light of
current circumstances, it is important that the need for appropriate le-
gal measures in this area should be kept under review." [What this re-
quires is a balancing of] interests of the community and the individual
"the search for which balance is inherent in the whole of the Conven-
tion." However, when the balance tilts in favor of the individual the
margin of appreciation disappears. That was the essence of the Court
of Human Rights's holding in the "homosexual sodomy" cases.'
1 6
The politically pivotal 'homosexual sodomy' case was Dudgeon. The
parallels to Bowers are striking. The differences in approach and result
between Dudgeon and Bowers reveal much about the utility of political
consciousness in constitutional decision-making.
Jeffrey Dudgeon, then a 35 year old resident of Northern Ireland,
admitted to being "consciously" homosexual from the age of 14. He had
been involved in a campaign to bring the laws of Northern Ireland in line
with those of other parts of the United Kingdom - to provide "that private
acts of buggery and gross indecency between consenting males over 21..
* should not be criminal offenses."1
17
In 1976, police went to Mr. Dudgeon's house to execute a warrant
pursuant to the Misuse of Drugs Act of 1971. During their search, some
of Dudgeon's personal papers and diaries were confiscated. Contained
within these items were descriptions of homosexual activities. "As a re-
sult he was asked to go to a police station where for about four-and-half
hours he was questioned, on the basis of these papers, about his sexual
life.""' 8 Some time later he was released, as the Director of Public Prose-
cutions felt it would not "be in the public interest" to bring proceedings.
Mr. Dudgeon's papers were returned more than a year later, complete
116. Backer, supra note 25, at 201.
117. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149 (1981).
118. Id.T 33.
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with written notes.
On May 22, 1976, Dudgeon applied to the European Commission of
Human Rights claiming that Northern Ireland's prohibition of private,
consensual male homosexual activity and the investigation pursuant to
the January 21 search of his papers "constituted an unjustified interfer-
ence with his right to respect for his private life.... ." "9 Dudgeon further
maintained that as a result of the law in Northern Ireland, "he suffered
unjustifiable discrimination on sexual grounds and also on grounds of his
residence because the offences in question were not part of the law in
other regions in the United Kingdom."' 20
The task for the Human Rights Commission, in Dudgeon, for exam-
ple, was to place the practices of Britain (in Northern Ireland) within a
European context of settled notions of the treatment of gay men. On the
basis of the proffered evidence, it was clear in proceedings before the
Commission that the statute was rarely enforced; indeed, the United
Kingdom argued that the case ought to be dismissed on that basis.12' It
was also clear that "public opinion" frowned on sexual acts between
men. 2 2 And yet the Commission explained that neither was sufficient to
impose restrictions on the private sexual liberty of sexual minorities in
the absence of proof that the law makes "any contribution of the moral
climate of society which could, within a reasonable relationship to pro-
portionality, justify or counter-balance the inevitable negative effects
which it has on the private lives of homosexuals."' 23 The Commission
reached this conclusion as a matter of politics. First there is the right to
private life which extends to sexual acts in private between people of the
same sex. 24 But that right is not unlimited. 125 It may be restricted by the
needs of a democratic society to protect the morals of its citizens. 126 But
in this case the "majority opinion of the population as a whole is not in
119. Id. 134.
120. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40, 5 (1981).
121. See id. 9189-91.
122. See id. 111-15.
123. Id.l 115.
124. See id. T1 97.
125. See id. 198.
126. The Commission explains:
[i]n assessing the requirements of the 'protections of morals' in Northern
Ireland, the Commission considers that it must examine the measures in
question in the context of Northern Irish society, taking into account the
information before it as to the climate of moral opinion in that particular
society. The fact that similar measures are not considered necessary in
other parts of the United Kingdom, or in other European countries does
not mean that they cannot be necessary in Northern Ireland.
Dudgeon v. United Kingdon, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 40,1 111 (1981).
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fact known."' 127 And on that basis the moral judgment of society as ex-
pressed through its law may be imposed on all as the default position of
law.
While these conclusions were largely accepted by the European
Court of Human Rights, it also affirmed the paramount importance of
changes in the popular culture as the basis for action. These changes were
to be gleaned from the political developments in the signatory states, and
that consensus would then be imposed on all.
As compared with the era when that legislation was enacted, there is
now a better understanding, and in consequence an increased toler-
ance, of homosexual behavior to the extent that in the great majority
of the member-States of the Council of Europe it is no longer consid-
ered to be necessary or appropriate to treat homosexual practices of
the kind in question as in themselves a matter to which the sanctions
of the criminal law should be applied; the Court cannot overlook the
marked changes which have occurred in this regard in the domestic
law of the member-States. 1
28
In this light, the peculiar moral standards of Northern Ireland and the
fear that relaxation of the criminalization of private homosexual conduct
would further erode moral standards, without proof that this would, in
fact be so within the peculiar confines of Northern Ireland, cannot justify
resistance to the reiterated popular cultural approaches to sexual non-
conformity fashioned within the polity (the member-states of the Council
of Europe) as a whole. And here Northern Ireland had failed to adduce
such proof.
It is to political developments, too, that the court looks to limit the
possible reach of its determinations. There were real limits to the changes
in popular perceptions of homosexual conduct. Beyond those limits the
court would not go. These limits touched on popular conceptions of the
necessity of protection from those vulnerable to the indiscriminate blan-
dishments of the 'homosexual.' These include the young, the 'weak-
minded', the inexperienced, or those vulnerable because of dependance
on a potential sexual exploiter.'29 The reality of courts of politics is the
recognition of the limitations of the 'bad' as well as the affirmation of the
'good.'
The Norris case brings these themes out in sharper focus. Norris
provided a way for the Court to upend in Ireland the same prohibition
against private, consensual, male homosexual activity that they had done
127. Id. 112.
128. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 1 60 (1981).
129. See id. 149.
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years earlier in Northern Ireland. Norris sought out the confrontation with
the Irish Government and ultimately the European Court of Human
Rights to reform the legislation that "interfered with his right to respect
for private life."""0 Again, as was noted in Dudgeon, the court and the
Irish government acknowledged that there were no public prosecutions of
homosexual activities during the relevant time period.
31
Before proceeding to the European Court of Human Rights, Norris's
case was dismissed by the Irish High Court. There, Justice McWilliam
found that "[o]ne of the effects of criminal sanctions against homosexual
acts is to reinforce the misapprehension and general prejudice of the pub-
lic and increase the anxiety and guilt feelings of homosexuals leading, on
occasion, to depression and the serious consequences which can follow
from that unfortunate disease."' 32 On appeal to the Supreme Court, Nor-
ris's dismissal was upheld on several grounds familiar to the courts of the
United States. These considerations included: that homosexuality is mor-
ally wrong and "has been regarded by society for many centuries as an
offense against nature and a very serious crime";33 that homosexuality
can lead to "great distress and unhappiness" possibly leading to suicide.
34
The Court also gave great weight to its notion that homosexual conduct
has lead to the spread of various venereal diseases which have caused a
significant health problem in England and that homosexuality is detri-
mental to the institution of marriage.
Before the Human Rights Court, the government argued that the
"moral fibre of a democratic nation is a matter for its own institutions and
the Government should be allowed a degree of tolerance, . . . a margin of
appreciation that would allow the democratic legislature to deal with this
problem in the manner which it sees best."' 35 The Court rejected this ar-
130. Norris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186, 25 (1988).




135. Id. 42. In a manner reminiscent of Justice Scalia's arguments about the role of the
Court in matters of morals set out in Romer, the Irish government argued that:
[tihe application of these criteria [pressing social need and proportional-
ity] emptied the 'moral exception' of meaning. In their view, the identifi-
cation of 'necessity' with 'pressing social need' in the context of moral
values is too restrictive and produces a distorting result, while the test of
proportionality involves the evaluation of moral issue and this is some-
thing that the Court should avoid if possible. Within broad parameters the
moral fibre of a democratic nation is a matter for its own institutions and
the Government should be allowed a degree of tolerance in its compliance
... that would allow the democratic legislature to deal with this problem
in the manner which it sees best."
Id. T 43.
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gument citing that to make such a determination, "the reality of the press-
ing social need . . must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued.''136 The court rebuffed the Government's attempt to preclude it
from review of Ireland's obligation not to interfere with an Article 8 right
when such deals with the interests of the 'protection of morals'. The
Court also noted that serious reasons must exist before government inter-
ference can be legitimate for purposes of Article 8.137 Applying the ana-
lytical framework developed in Dudgeon, the Court found that the evi-
dence showed that Ireland no longer enforced the relevant law, and that
there appeared no strong public demand for stricter enforcement. Neither
had been detrimental to the moral standards of the Irish people. Nor was
the existence of the law proportional to the detrimental effects on the pri-
vate lives of individuals caused by the continued validity of this (cur-
rently) unenforced law. On that basis the Court held that "it cannot be
maintained that there is a 'pressing social need' to make such [homosex-
ual] acts criminal offenses."' 38 "Although members of the public who
regard homosexuality as immoral may be shocked, offended or disturbed
by the commission by others of private homosexual acts, this cannot on
its own warrant the application of penal sanctions when it is consenting
adults alone who are involved."'
139
Norris defined the parameters of the newly recognized political real-
ity. Thereafter, the cases were not hard. In Europe, popular cultural
norms, the habits of ordinary European citizens makes it exceedingly
difficult to find particularly serious reasons creating a pressing social
need to criminalize sexual activity between men. Modinos v. Cyprus4 ) is
a case in point. In that case, a statute criminalizing private sexual activity
between adult men was determined to violate the Human Rights Conven-
tion even though the Cypriot Attorney General had as a matter of policy
declined prosecutions under the act. The Cypriot act violates the protec-
tions of the Human Rights Convention not as a matter of high principle,
but because Europeans in fact treat those statutes as of no effect. Because
its only continuing effect, then, was (gratuitously) negative, its existence
could not be supported under the Human Rights Convention's Article 8
guarantee of protection from interference with the right to respect of an
136. Id. I44.
137. Thus, the Court noted that "It]he Government is in effect saying that the Court is pre-
cluded from reviewing Ireland's observance of its obligations not to exceed what is neces-
sary in a democratic society when the contested interference with an Article 8 right is in the
interests of the 'protection of morals."' The Court cannot accept such an interpretation. Nor-
ris v. Ireland, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 186, 45 (1988).
138. Id. T 46.
139. Id.
140. 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1993).
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individual's private life. 141
But note that political reality has limitations - that is the part of poli-
tics which is always dangerous. Indeed, that is the reality which, in dis-
torted form, is raised by Justice Scalia's suggestion in Romer that "homo-
sexuals are as entitled to use the legal system for reinforcement of their
moral sentiments as is the rest of society. But they are subject to being
countered by lawful, democratic countermeasures as well."'42 For exam-
ple, in Dudgeon the Court noted both that political reality in Europe evi-
denced increased toleration for 'homosexual' behavior, but also evi-
denced no desire to 'approve' of homosexuality so that regulation of such
conduct beyond that perhaps permitted in the case of heterosexual con-
duct and which "may even extend to consensual acts committed in pri-
vate" would not violate the Human Rights Convention's norms. 43
Thus the margin of appreciation is not a weapon in the arsenal of the
adherents of any particular social or political or moral creed. This general
principle of law, like all useful principles is amoral, at least in the sense
of serving as a vehicle for the advancement of politically expressed social
goals. The margin of appreciation is a conservative principle of law; it
limits the range of political intervention of courts in interpreting funda-
mental law. The principle is meant to lead courts to an interpretive pro-
141. In the words of the Human Rights Commission as reported in the opinion of the Court
of Human Rights:
the Government's admission that the challenged provisions are contrary to
the Cypriot Constitution, combined with the position of the Attorney-
General not to prosecute persons in the situation of the applicant, show
that, in comparison with the era when that legislation was enacted, there is
now a better understanding, and in consequence an increased tolerance, of
homosexual behavior in Cyprus, as it is in the great majority of the mem-
ber-States of the Council of Europe.
... In this respect it should be noted that the retaining of the law in force
unamended on the ground that members of the public in Cyprus may be
offended or disturbed by the commission by others of private homosexual
acts ... is outweighed by the detrimental effects which the very existence
of the impugned provisions can have on the life of a person with a homo-
sexual tendency like the applicant."
Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485, In 45-46 (1993).
142. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 646 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has
been consistent in his view of the rights process as essentially political. See, e.g., Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) ("It may fairly be said that leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic
government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious
beliefs." Id. at 890).
143. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 49 (1981).
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nouncement of what is. It cannot be used to interpret the fundamental law
to impose a court's personal version of what could be. It dampens not
merely the temptation to use the courts for legislative purposes by the
'left' but also the same temptation by the 'right.' This can prove frustrat-
ing for those who would rely on the courts to move beyond the role of
imposing political reality.'" The principle, perhaps legitimately, results in
the return to the political arena those issues with respect to which there is
no constitutional consensus among a polity.1
45
But it also limits the ability of originalists and traditionalists to mur-
der our fundamental law by embalming it in the musty memory of what
can never be recaptured. Alexander Hamilton understood this quite well
when he defended the construction of an independent judiciary of life-
tenured judges.146 Justice Scalia continues to contest this argument at his
peril - it makes his reliance-on-tradition argument suspect, standing
alone;'47 it also reduces his arguments about subjectivity in constitutional
interpretation as questionable as well. Changing societal reality changes
the enduring jurisprudence of courts, and not the other way around.
144. See, e.g., Clarice B. Rabinowitz, Note, Proposals for Progress: Sodomy Laws and the
European Convention on Human Rights, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 425, 455-68 (1995) (propos-
ing a more aggressive interpretative stance on the basis of the Court's own acknowledgment
of its political role to interpret the Convention "in light of present day condition." Id. at 457
n.170).
145. That this effect is real can be demonstrated by the Human Rights Court refusal to find
a consensus in the area of abortion rights. For people seeking change in that area, then, the
result is a recognition that the only means of effecting change within the democratic order is
political, mobilizing democratic forces to enact changes to the black letter of the fundamental
law of the polity. See, e.g., Klashtomy, supra note 98, at 441-42.
146. Hamilton argued, of course, that this argument was self-defeating.
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a repug-
nancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional intentions of
the legislature. This might well happen in the case of two contradictory
statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication upon any single
statute. The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be
disposed to exercise will instead of judgment, the consequence would
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body.
The observation, if it prove anything, would prove that there ought to be
no judges distinct from that body.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468-69 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
147. Consider a pristine form of this argument, Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604
(1990).
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IV. APPLIED POLITICS - ROMER AND BOWERS AS POLITICAL EXPRESSION
When the Supreme Court acts like a 'court of politics, like a Dudg-
eon or Norris court, its decisions will be given more deference than when
the Court appears to pronounce a law which does not mirror the cultural
reality at the time of its pronouncement. I would assert that the Romer
case is a good example of a decision of 'politics.' On the other hand,
Bowers is an excellent example a pronouncement not in sync with core
social reality. It is problematical and likely not to last long in its present
form.
Romer demonstrates the power of politics as the vehicle for deter-
mining law, and the utility of explaining the law in terms of the concur-
rence of jurisprudence and politics. Romer was a case of dirty pool. Ro-
mer illustrates the authority of decisions which recognize that sex is poli-
tics. In a sense, the Court merely confirmed what our political society had
long held true - that everyone should be allowed to 'play' the game of
republican politics. "Homosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that oth-
ers enjoy or may seek without constraint. They can obtain specific protec-
tion only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend the state consti-
tution. '48 The majority sought to do little more than to identify the basic
rules within which republican principles of politics works in this country.
These are not new rules, or rules with no connection to actual practice.
The problem, of course, as the majority saw, and as Justice Scalia's
ideology could not fathom, is that our popular political culture does not
permit the use of the democratic process to push any participant out of the
game. And that is what the amendment at issue in Romer effectively did.
The Justices spent some time considering this point at oral argument,
where the issue was crystallized. 149 Members of what became the major-
ity devoted some time to an inquiry of the way in which Americans tradi-
tionally played the political game of republicanism in this century.
150
148. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). Justice Scalia, in dissent, had a far nar-
rower view of what sort of political participation would be enough. Homosexual political
advances are subject "to being countered by lawful, democratic countermeasures as well." Id.
at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This includes "the democratic adoption of provisions in state
constitutions." Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
149. See Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 51-56, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (No. 94-1039), available in 1995 WL 605822. As Jean E. Dubofsky argued on behalf
of respondents, the question was whether the referendum process constituted a prohibited
"restructuring of the political process." Id. at 51.
150. This was made quite apparent in oral argument. Thus, for instance, Justice Ginsburg
drew analogies to the political give and take of the suffragists at the turn of the twentieth
century. See Official Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-17, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (No. 94-1039), available in 1995 WL 605822 ("1 was trying to think of something
comparable to this, and what occurred to me is that this political means of going at the local
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Thus, properly understood, the Romer majority relies on tradition to sup-
port their decision.
It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort.
Central both to the idea of the rule of law and our own Constitution's
guarantee of equal protection is the principle that government and
each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its as-
sistance.151
Justice Scalia, in dissent, correctly states (though he seems to fail to un-
derstand) the strength of that argument. 52 Scalia's dissent, ironically, is
also based on tradition, but of a different kind,'53 the kind afforded pre-
eminence in Bowers.
54
In the end, Justice Scalia's traditional values had to give way to those
championed by the majority, and sensibly so - Colorado's legislature is
as capable of protecting traditional moral values as is the population it
represents, and the former, not the latter, has been designated the primary
site of law making. This is a case in sync with core social realities. Our
founders chose for our political home Republican Rome, not democratic
Athens.'55 That choice imports with it a sense of the dignity of each of the
citizens of that polity. Romer is a case in sync with that core social real-
ity. It will survive.
The more interesting question, however, is what precisely about Ro-
mer, beside its particular holding, will survive to govern future cases.
That question requires consideration of the relationship between Romer
and Bowers. Romer was written in the shadow of Bowers. Yet nowhere in
the majority opinion is the Bowers opinion mentioned. The Romer major-
ity was deliberately silent on Bowers. That silence has opened a tremen-
dous hole - not because the members of the majority do not know their
level first is familiar in American politics." Id. at 14).
151. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. at 633.
152. "Lacking any cases to establish that facially absurd proposition [that the sort of state-
wide constitutional amendment through referendum at issue in the case], it simply asserts
that it must be unconstitutional, because it has never happened before." Id. at 647 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). That is precisely the point. Tradition militates against this sort of fundamental
wrenching of political culture in the absence of evidence of a substantial amount of accep-
tance of these rules in fact.
153. "The Court today ... employs a constitutional theory heretofore unknown to frustrate
Colorado's reasonable effort to preserve traditional American moral values." Id. at 651.
154. As Justice Scalia noted in dissent in Romer, "[i]f it is constitutionally permissible for a
state to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it is a constitutionally permissible for a
state to enact other laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct." Id. at 641.
155. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, at 81-84, 39, at 240-46, 63, at 385-88 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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own minds on the question, but because they chose to throw the question
back to the litigating community.
The problem with Romer, of course, is in its meaning. It is exceed-
ingly difficult to search for meaning in Romer with any degree of con-
fidence. It is even harder to divine the utility of the case. As a rhetori-
cal device, the majority opinion is a study in majesty. It is Handelian
in its oratory, truly the voice of the Divinity speaking to its children...
. As rhetoric it works well to camouflage the ambiguities inherent in
the stately procession of the words of that opinion. More importantly,
Justice Kennedy's Olympian tone effectively casts the dissent, not in
the role of Milton's Lucifer, but rather in that of the archetypal mad
heroine of opera seria. . . . So reduced, the power of its argument is
lost in the "mad" lust of its rhetoric, and it can be avoided by that
large number in the Academy with a taste for the antiseptic. 1
6
The ambiguity of the majority position in Romer also brands that de-
cision as essentially political. It does so in a way that serves to highlight
the political inadequacy of Bowers. Those who want to draw positive
value from the decision for this or that ideological, cultural or political
program have been far less reticent about the importance of Romer to
Bowers in the months since the decision has come down. Some have ar-
gued that Romer is a "seminal decision in the jurisprudence of equal pro-
tection for gay people." '157 It is also possible to argue that the Court em-
ployed what has been described as new tier of equal protection analysis -
rational basis with teeth.'58
Others take a more cautious approach to the language of the majority
opinion, arguing that the majority opinion merely applied the rarely in-
voked by fundamental principle that the law may not be used to create a
class of "untouchables" - the pariah principle.'59 The narrowest reading
156. Backer, supra note 20, at 380.
157. Wolff, supra note 20, at 248. The notion is that, like Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971), did for females, Romer will lead to some sort of heightened scrutiny for laws which
adversely impact gay people. Id. See also Bobbi Bernstein, Power, Prejudice, and the Right
to Speak: Litigating 'Outness' Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 STAN. L. REv. 269
(1995).
158. For example, Andrew Jacobs argues that "Romer heralds: (1) a muscular rational basis
review that may invalidate civil laws aimed at the class of gays; (2) a significant possibility
of overruling Bowers; and (3) a greater solicitude for gay claims in many areas of the law."
Jacobs, supra note 20, at 963. For a critique of rational basis with teeth as an additional cate-
gory, see Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis With Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny By Any
Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987).
159. Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry have recently argued that the case merely articu-
lates a far-reaching but narrow principle which they christen the pariah principle. "This prin-
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suggest that the majority opinion reflected the rejection of a law imposing
unprecedented disabilities on a group with little in the way of reason to
support it. Animus may well be a result and even a permissible result of
reason, but reason must support the animus; this might well be one of
those cases where rational basis actually suffices to invalidate a statute.6 '
Traditionalists admit what the majority in Romer could not - that
Romer effectively silenced Bowers. Foremost among these commentators
has been Robert Bork. 6' Unhappily to be sure, traditionalists have recog-
nized the new tradition being forged for the equal protection jurispru-
dence of the Court. "Moral objections to homosexual practices is not the
same thing as animus, unless all disapprovals based on morality are to be
disallowed as mere animus."'
162
And yet, animus was at the heart of Bowers. The story Bowers really
related was one of social and moral disapprobation, and the weight such
disapprobation was to be accorded in law. The tradition of animus, pre-
dating the federal Constitution, could not be overcome by evolving no-
tions of Constitutional hermeneutics. So, what of Bowers? Romer makes
it clear that Bowers is at least suspect. It confirms the vulnerability of
ciple, in a nutshell, forbids the government from designating any societal group as untouch-
able, regardless of whether the group in question is generally entitled to some special degree
of judicial protection, like blacks, or to no special protection, like left-handers (or, under
current doctrine, homosexuals)." Farber & Sherry, supra note 20, at 258. In a similar vein,
Akil Amar has reconfigured this pariah principle more formally as a constitutional event
implicating the ancient attainder principles of the federal Constitution. Amar, supra note 20;
but see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Is Amendment 2 Really a Bill of Attainder? Some Questions
About Professor Amar's Analysis of Romer, 95 MICH. L. Rev. 236 (1996). This is a minimal-
ist approach to the potential inherent in the hortatory expressions of majority opinion, which
seeks to avoid the problems which a broad interpretation of the majority's "rational basis"
analysis might pose.
160. See, e.g., Constitutional Law Scholars Attempt to Distill Recent Supreme Court Term,
65 U.S.L.W. 2274, 2277 (October 29, 1996) (quoting Jesse H. Choper). Here, a variant of
this reasoning goes, the state was unable to offer reasons even arguably connected with the
disability and (more importantly) its breadth. See Hills, supra note 162 (arguing that
Amendment 2 met its demise on the basis of the breadth of the disabilities it imposed). Pas-
sion, alone, is insufficiently rational to support the disability. In the future, the state will be
more careful.
161. He finds no "logical or constitutional foundation for the majority's decision." BORK,
supra note 20, at 114. Taking his cue from the dissent, he finds in Romer little more than
naked politics. The decision reflects the power and ability of the homosexual elite and their
worldwide conspiracy to substitute their culture for that which preceded it. For Bork, Romer
does for gay people what Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) rehearing denied 410 U.S. 959
(1973), did for heterosexual morality. In both, the "Court, without authority in the Constitu-
tion or any law, has forced Americans to adopt the Court's view of morality rather than their
own." BORK, supra.
162. BORK, supra note 20, at 113.
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decisions that ignore changes in the politics of judgment in core areas of
human behavior. Tradition is valuable if it is current; tradition cannot be
used in the service of politics if it assumes a substantially historical role.
Bowers amounts to an effort to blind our jurisprudence to the changing
social realities of the criminal regulation of private adult consensual ac-
tivity in the states. As an effort to vaunt theory (or, better, rhetoric) over
reality, the case positioned itself for oblivion from the time of its pro-
nouncement. The ideological traditionalists responsible for Bowers might
have done well to heed the warning of that great conservative, Lord Dev-
lin, who warned that "[it will not in the long run work to make laws
about morality that are not acceptable to 'those from whom the moral
judgments of society are ascertained."'" 63 Those who argue for the utility
of decisional minimalism, 16 maintain that because Bowers speaks
strongly to a tradition different from that invoked in Romer, it is possible
to carve out a small space in which Bowers might still speak authorita-
tively. In the more traditionalist language of Professor Sunstein: "The
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses have very different offices,
and Hardwick is not in tension with Romer so long as those different of-
fices are kept in mind."'
' 65
163. Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals, in MORALITY AND THE LAW 31 (Robert
M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1988) (reprinted in edited form from PATRICK
DEVLIN, T-E ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965)).
164. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 20. Thus, "the case for minimalism is especially strong
if the area involves a highly contentious question that is currently receiving sustained democ-
ratic attention." Id. at 32. And, yet, there is more than a whiff of Scalia in Professor Sun-
stein's view. Consider an earlier articulation of Professor Sunstein's reticence on such deli-
cate issue as same sex marriage and referenda such as that at issue in Romer:
[u]nder contemporary conditions, a judicial holding of this sort [requiring
states to allow same sex marriage] would probably be a large mistake,
even though the basic principle is sound. It would be far better for the
courts to proceed slowly and incrementally. I have suggested that they
should build on 'rationality review' in the most egregious cases and also
invalidate measures that combine restrictions on the democratic process
with discrimination. Broader rulings should be avoided. Elected officials,
including the president, have somewhat more flexibility in carrying out
their own independent constitutional responsibilities.
Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 27-28 (1994).
165. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 67. Professor Sunstein suggests that
Romer combined a degree of caution and prudence with a good under-
standing of the fundamental purpose of the Equal Protection Clause and a
firm appreciation of the law's expressive function. Thus understood, Ro-
mer was a masterful stroke - an extraordinary and salutary moment in
American law. It was a masterful stroke in part because it left many issues
open.
Id. at 9, see also id. at 53-71. I do agree that the porousness of Romer was a masterful stroke.
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MARGINS OF APPRECIATION
However, the tradition invoked in Bowers, while historically true
enough, had lost much of its potency by the time the Bowers majority
sought to invoke it. Defending a tradition that was no longer coherent,
Bowers stands both as a misinterpretation of the conservative approach to
politics, and the intrusive proactive intervention of a court in a cultural
dispute. Much like Justice McWilliam speaking for the Irish High Court
in Norris, the Bowers majority cast about myopically around a tradition
which had lost its force within the nation as a whole. The Court, to use
the margin of appreciation's language of deference, chose to permit a
broad margin of appreciation in where the constitutional traditions of the
Member States of the United States and their actual practice now attested
to a solid consensus against the validity of the legislation under attack in
that case. The Bowers majority thus lost sight of the nature of judicial
traditionalism - both its basic political contextualism 166 and its necessary
hermeneutics. 167 As both politics and traditionalism, the Bowers majority
I am not so sure that, as Professor Sunstein characterizes it, that stroke was good.
166. Traditionalism has rightly been characterized as having "been cast in vague terms."
TANNSJO, supra note 54, at 47. Vagueness can only be resolved in political context. "The
standard resolution is as follows. When assessing a suggested political reform we have to
decide whether it is faithful to a well-established existing idiom of conduct or not." Id. That
determination must be made by "[t]he people concerned; I think the conservative [would]
answer." Id. In particular, the people concerned must decide if there exists the requisite simi-
larities between the prior state of affairs and the proposed state of affairs. See id. But Bowers
seems to do just the opposite, and in the name of traditionalism! The problem, of course, is
that the idiom - a unified and coherent understanding of the response of society to homo-
sexuality and homosexual "acts" - was no longer singular or coherent. That is certainly true
among "those concerned." As such, unity of opinion, and tradition as such unity, could be
achieved, and the decision supported, by narrowing the scope of those whose voices would
count in the determination. But isn't this (informally to be sure) precisely what the Romer
court suggested was dirty pool when done formally by invoking the constitutional process of
the state? Clearly the answer is yes. Bowers in this sense is both faulty traditionalism and bad
politics.
167. The traditionalism of Bowers is hard to square even with the traditionalism of a con-
servative like Roger Scrouton. Scrouton would have conservatives foster traditions which
satisfy three criteria. ROGER SCROUTON, THE MEANING OF CONSERVATISM 42 (1980). It must
first have "the weight of a successful history." Id. It is not at all clear that the history of the
suppression of sexual expression by sexual minorities has ever been successful or whole-
hearted. Cf. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAWS, SEX AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE
(1987); DAVID F. GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1988). It must also
"engage the loyalty of their participants, in the deep sense of moulding their idea of what
they are or should be." SCROUTON, supra, at 42. Here, loyalty was assured by some but all
participants. See discussion supra note 109. Division significantly weakens the hold of tradi-
tion as a basis for action. Lastly, for Scrouton, "they must point to something durable, some-
thing which survives and gives meaning to the acts that emerge from it." SCROUTON, supra,
at 42. By 1986, it was exceedingly difficult to make that argument except with respect to a
limited segment of the population.
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failed.
Other than as a matter of ideology, Bowers does not reflect the prac-
tice, the reality of the relationship of culture to the private consensual
sexual practices of sexual minorities. A large number of American states
had decriminalized the sexual acts at issue in Bowers de jure by the time
the case was heard by the Court. The remaining states had largely de-
criminalized sodomy de facto.16 These states enforced the criminal sex
laws, not in cases of private consensual sexual activity between people of
the same sex, but where the consensual conduct or its solicitation oc-
curred in public.'69 This was a reality of long standing at the time Bowers
was before the Court. It constituted a significant reason for the "decrimi-
nalization" of sodomy written into the Model Penal Code in the late
1950's and early 1960's.7' It was a reality which confronted the English
as well at about the same time. 71 Even traditionalists recognized this.'72
168. For a case study of the evolution of such de facto decriminalization, at least where the
act occurred in private between two consenting adults, see, e.g., Larry Catd Backer, Raping
Sodomy and Sodomizing Rape: A Morality Tale About the Transformation of Modern Sod-
omy Jurisprudence, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 37, 89-95 (1993).
169. While, as this essay demonstrates, this approach is also highly problematical, for pur-
poses of the determination before the Court in Bowers, it was powerful evidence of cultural
practice which should not have been ignored. As Markus Dirk Dubber noted that the Euro-
pean court
focused its attention on recent developments in public perceptions of the
limits of acceptable government interference as reflected in legislative de-
velopments in the member states. The Supreme Court chose both a wider
focus and a more static method ... [scanning] only the long term Ameri-
can legislative landscape but also disregarded trends by searching for dis-
tinct manifestations of a right to engage in homosexual sodomy.
Dubber, supra note 28, at 210-11.
170. This is recounted in Backer, supra note 48. For a contemporary report, see, e.g., Mor-
ris Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 COLUM. J.L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 217, 218, 221 (1960) (the author was the associate reporter of the Model Penal Code
during the 1950's).
171. The notion that the costs of enforcement were hardly worth the benefits, sporadic at
best, figured prominently in the calculus of the drafters of the Model Penal Code and the
Wolfenden Report. There is something quite unseemly about enforcement focusing on pri-
vate sexual conduct. See COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION,
REPORT, THE WOLFENDEN REPORT (Auth. American ed. 1963) ([i 109-13 (blackmail), 91
121-23 (police misconduct)).
172. Thus, for example, Justice Scalia notes in Romer, that "abolition simply reflects the
view that enforcement of such criminal laws involves unseemly intrusion into the intimate
lives of citizens." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 645 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). David
Garrow noted that:
[m]any conservative constitutional scholars, however, were loathe to em-
brace the Bowers majority. Roe critic and Reagan administration Solicitor
General Charles Fried subsequently disparaged "White's stunningly harsh
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This reality governs even the continued criminalization of public expres-
sions of same sex desire in states which have decriminalized its private
consummation. 
173
The political reality of the emerging tradition was plain for all to see.
A court applying the principles of consensus, restraint and deference, a
Dudgeon or Norris court, might have understood
there is now a better understanding, and in consequence an increased
tolerance, of homosexual behavior to the extent that in the great ma-
jority of the . states of the [Union] it is no longer considered to be
necessary or appropriate to treat homosexual practices... as in them-
selves a matter to which the sanctions of the criminal law should be
applied.
174
A court which adheres to the principles of deference and consensus in its
necessarily political decisions, decisions involving the application of the
fundamental law, "cannot overlook the marked changes which have oc-
curred in this regard in the domestic law of the... member-States. '75 To
do so is to be left in the position of the Irish High Court in Norris - out of
touch with the polity whose laws the court is under an obligation to say
what the law is.
All of this history was known, and yet ignored, in the Bowers opin-
ion. The result is both odd and politically reckless. 6 But then, the Bow-
and dismissive opinion" and characterized Hardwick's conduct as first
and foremost "an act of private association and communication. The fact
that sexuality is implicated seems an anatomical irrelevance." Legal pun-
dit Bruce Fein, conservative even by Reagan administration standards,
admitted that "the political case for judicial rescue of homosexuals from
the legislative process was greater than for the Griswold intervention on
behalf of married couples," and warned that in light of the doctrinal con-
tradictions between Bowers and previous holdings, the American public
would "correctly" conclude that the Court's privacy decisions were based
on simply "the varied personal policy predilections of the Justices" them-
selves.
DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF
ROE V. WADE 666 (1994).
173. See, e.g., Baluyut v. Superior Court, 911 P.2d I (Cal. 1996) (assertion that California
solicitation statute was used to target gay men in a California city; the Supreme Court hold-
ing that proof of specific intent to discriminatorily target a specific group need not be proven
in order to prevail; California has decriminalized private sexual activity between people of
the same sex).
174. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 149, 60 (1982).
175. Id.
176. The political recklessness of this case began with the road to the decision to hear the
case in the first place. For a description of the politics of the determination to hear the case,
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ers majority refused to stay tied to facts; it saw no need to. The Bowers
opinion, instead, builds a decision on a sea of rhetoric. The opinion
makes a nice sermon; it does not reflect the political realities, the practi-
calities, of American popular culture in the latter part of the twentieth
century and will either be ignored or swept aside sooner or later.'77
V. CONCLUSION
Decisions like Romer, then, highlight the reality that though courts
intervene all the time, they only rarely intervene to change the perceived
status quo. The nature of that intervention in the United States tends t be
traditional, with a marked deference to the elected branches of govern-
ment. The general principle of law underlying the American approach to
judicial deference to the legislature represents an American variation on
the European margin of appreciation principle. American principles of
deference are best illustrated by cases highlighting the limits of defer-
ence. In the United States, as in Europe, that limit is marked by consen-
sus. The Supreme Court's opinions in Romer178 illustrate both the applica-
tion of the principle and the difficulties involved in the translation of the
conceptfrom a civil law to a common-law system. The Romer majority
rose to the defense of a political consensus on the nature of the electoral
process. The generally accepted status quo marks the limit of deference to
the elected branches in the practice of statutory interpretation. This nor-
mative status quo was far more stable and unchallenged than the conten-
tious and amorphous tradition of the political suppression of sexual mi-
norities.179 The margin of deference accorded Colorado, in this regard,
would have to be quite small. The judicial act in Romer, from the per-
spective of the margin of appreciation, appears quite conservative.
Bowers, on the other hand, illustrates the consequences of deviation
see GARROW, supra note 172, at 656-57.
177. Indeed, this seemed to concern the dissenters in Romer a great deal, as evidenced by
their dissent, as well as by their questions at oral argument. See Official Transcript of Oral
Argument at 53-54, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039), available in 1995
WL 605822.( Question: "Ms. Dubofsky, do you contend that - are you asking us to overrule
Bowers v. Hardwick? Answer: "No, I am not."). In the dissent, itself, Justice Scalia first
states that the majority's opinion "contradicted" the decision in Bowers. See Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Then he reminds us that states have been
permitted to make homosexual conduct a crime "from the founding of the Republic." Id. at
640. On that basis he then makes his a fortiori argument. Id. at 641 (quoted supra note 79).
Unfortunately for the dissent, this misses the point entirely.
178. See text infra Part IV.
179. While the criminal suppression of sexually deviant behavior has been a staple of the
criminal law in the West, the suppression of sexual minorities in the political sphere has not.
See Backer, supra note 168.
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from the principle of judicial restraint along the lines of the margin of
appreciation. When courts do appear to intervene to set or settle the status
quo in an area of conduct in which no social consensus exists, such deci-
sions will invariably be less authoritative. 8 ' In such circumstances, a
greater margin of appreciation, of deference to the state's political settle-
ment of the issue within its territory, is required. To use language more
comfortable to American lawyers, in these circumstances the courts
should stay their hand, and leave resolution of the issue to the political
process. Ultimately such decisions become so much litter on the socio-
political landscape. They provide greatest value either by the ceremonial
act of their repudiation, 8' or by the hortatory significance of their rheto-
ric. As Justice Scalia, himself, has explained: "when a practice not ex-
pressly prohibited by the text of the Bill of Rights bears the endorsement
of a long tradition of open, widespread, and unchallenged use that dates
back to the beginning of the Republic, we have no proper basis for strik-
ing it down."' 82 The emphasis for Justice Scalia, of course, is on the
words 'long,' 'tradition,' and 'open.' He minimizes the importance of the
word 'unchallenged.' A state's power to continue to impose traditional
restrictions when a new and contradictory consensus has arisen in the
great majority of other states is not protected through a constitutionaliza-
tion of history. Decisions such as Bowers v. Hardwick183 well highlight
Justice Scalia's notions of the limitations of courts as vehicles for the im-
position of change. The deference principles of the margin of apprecia-
tion teaches us that while the Bowers decision might have been correct at
180. See generally, Backer, supra note 23.
181. Thus, for example, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (legislative requirement
of racial segregation in public transport does not violate the equal protection clause) and
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down statute regulating working hours)
have retained significant value precisely because they so well crystalize now repudiated
judicial construction of our fundamental law. See, e.g., United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S.
712 (1992) (separate but equal construction of federal constitution no longer has a place in
the field of public education; the courts role now is to determine and apply standards under
which states must meet their affirmative obligations to dismantle de jure segregated schools)
and United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1994) ("Unlike Lochner and our more recent
Isubstantive due process' cases, today's decision enforces only the Constitution and not 'ju-
dicial policy judgments."' Id. at 600 n.9, Thomas, J., concurring).
182. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 95 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Justice
Scalia points out that VMI comes from a long line of such tradition. Scalia also points out
that all of the federal military colleges were single sex until 1976 - when the people, through
their elected representatives, changed that. See id. at 569. "The people may decide to change
the one tradition, like the other, through democratic processes; but the assertion that either
tradition has been unconstitutional through the centuries is not law, but politics-smuggled-
into-law." Id. at 569.
183. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
one time, but by the time of the decision a consensus had formed respect-
ing the nature of society's toleration of sexual minorities. That consensus,
evidenced by the rise in states in which sexual practices had been de-
criminalized, or in which the state had ceased to prosecute such activities,
mirrored that which supported the decision in Dudgeon.
Romer was not about conduct, but identity. It was not about the
power to criminalize conduct, but the way in which republican principles
developed at the time of the founding of the Republic would be exercised
in practice and could be limited in fact. In contrast, the Bowers court con-
cern with homosexuals and their 'practices,' this obsession with the need
to bolster a politically weak opinion, caused them to miss the point of
subsequent cases. Romer was not Bowers, and yet to Justice Scalia's
Bowers-obsessed dissent in Romer, there was no difference. Political de-
cisions, properly understood are both good and necessary functions of a
Court. As constitutional monitor or interpreters of our core legal norms,
the Court serves as a mouthpiece of our normative status quo.
Romer and Bowers were about politics - about the judicial declara-
tion of the normative status quo as then currently practiced within com-
mon (popular) culture. Neither case can escape this characterization - no
decision construing the federal Constitution can. All such decisions are
necessarily political because they involve the hermeneutics of political
conventions. Judicial hermeneutics, in the form of Constitutional
interpretation, like its counterparts in the legislative and administrative
branches, is imbued with a great degree of cultural freedom, which courts
use liberally, if sometimes incorrectly.
I end with a paraphrase of Justice Scalia, corrected to invert his
meaning in the context in which he spoke. "So to counterbalance [tradi-
tionalist] criticism of our ancestors [and the common law courts they be-
queathed us], let me say a word in their praise: they left us free to
change."' 1 I celebrate what Robert Bork finds so distressing (when he is
on the wrong end of interpretation): "[t]he Court will change the Consti-
tution as politics and culture change." ' Of course, he is wrong - the
Court will change the interpretive potential of the words of the Constitu-
tion. The Constitution itself remains unchanged - ever ready for modu-
lated readings to suit the times, and all based, if you like, on the original
intent of the founders! The political enterprise of the Courts, like those of
our legislature, is written in malleable stone. Hermeneutics provides the
tools for writing on that stone. Hermeneutics works because, when used
to write without changing the basic character of the stone, it appears to
affect no change at all. In this manner have those who in every society are
charged with the priestly function stayed true to the eternal verities of the
184. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 567 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
185. BORK, supra note 20, at 109.
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authoritative word while molding those words to suit the needs of the
moment. Thus does our Court provide the eternal words of the federal
Constitution with a form and substance which can be implemented and
reimplemented to suit the needs of every generation.

